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ABSTRACT
A recurring debate, in the aftermath of mass atrocity, is whether
states should pursue traditional justice through criminal prosecutions or promote peace through alternative mechanisms like truth
and reconciliation commissions (TRCs). As scholars have increasingly recognized, however, a multitude of mechanisms meant to
deal with past wrongdoings tend to emerge during periods of transition. Nonetheless, due to the legacy of this polarizing debate, additional research is needed on how their work can be mutually reenforcing in practice. Recent literature has explored whether the sequence of these mechanisms affects long-term outcomes, such as
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democratic consolidation and respect for human rights, but not how
their interaction in practice might contribute to these goals.
This Article helps fill that void through an in-depth analysis of
the interface between TRCs and traditional justice in the case of Guatemala, a country where over time both arose. In addition to being
the first study to gather and analyze the sentences in the cases that
resulted in convictions for grave crimes committed during Guatemala’s thirty-six-year internal armed conflict, it bases its findings on
over two dozen interviews with judges, prosecutors, and human
rights attorneys who have firsthand knowledge of those cases. The
study also includes critical insights from the leadership of the TRCs
that documented the atrocities committed during that period.
What emerged from these primary sources is a compelling example of how these mechanisms can be complementary. On one
hand, criminal justice proceedings, or the absence of them, can inform the work of TRCs. On the other hand, although TRCs have
traditionally been portrayed as second-rate substitutes for justice,
they can serve valuable functions that promote rule of law. For instance, TRCs can act as essential investigators and custodians of evidence in contexts where the state is complicit or directly involved
in the underlying atrocities. Additionally, they can be vehicles for
liberalization, creating opportunities for alternative voices, norms,
and narratives to surface. Indeed, as the case of Guatemala shows,
they can transform local judicial decision-making by diffusing international human rights norms and recasting the historical context in
ways that influence how judges define and determine responsibility
for crimes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past, legal scholarship characterized transitional justice as
a tug of war between the competing demands of “peace versus justice,” sometimes framed as “truth versus justice.”1 Generally, advocates, who promoted “peace” as the top priority in times of transition, favored amnesties or truth and reconciliation commissions
(TRCs) as justice substitutes, insisting that any greater accountability could upset fragile peace and lead to backlash.2 Those who favored “justice” in the form of criminal prosecutions argued that international law required it and that the rule of law could not be
established until wrongdoers were punished for their crimes.3
More recently, there is increased recognition that transitional
Instead,
justice solutions are not nearly so dichotomous.4
1 Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 81 (2002). Ruti Teitel, who
coined the phrase “transitional justice,” defines it as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003). Naomi Roht-Arriaza
critiques Ruti Teitel’s definition of transitional justice as unnecessarily abstract and
legalistic. In addition, she argues that Teitel’s definition implies a clearly defined
period of time, although oftentimes transitions are not so demarcated and can last
for decades. Therefore, she defines transitional justice as a “set of practices, mechanisms, and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife, or repression, that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 1–2 (Cambridge Univ.
Press ed., 2006).
2
See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 43 (2003/2004)
(“Trials do little to deter further violence and are not highly correlated with the
consolidation of peaceful democracy.”); see also Max Boot, When ‘Justice’ and ‘Peace’
Don’t Mix, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A34 (citing the post-World War II war crimes
tribunals as an example of balancing justice and peace principles in a post-conflict
context).
3
See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2540 (1991) (arguing that
“the central importance of the rule of law in civilized societies requires, within defined but principled limits, prosecution of especially atrocious crimes”).
4
See Chandra Lekha Sriran, Remarks at ASIL Proceedings: Transitional Justice
and Peacebuilding: Tensions and Complementarities, in 107 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 83
(2013) (discussing the complementarities and tensions between justice and peacebuilding); Dustin N. Sharp, Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding
and Transitional Justice Through the Lens of Critique, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 165 (2013);
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transitional justice tends to be sequenced, with post-conflict societies
over time resorting to a combination of mechanisms, often with
overlapping goals.5 Indeed, in many post-conflict countries around
the world, truth commissions have documented evidence of international crimes, which is later useful in criminal prosecutions.6
The use of multiple transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict countries is not likely to abate. This trend has increased in part
due to the proliferation of prosecutions in the last few decades,
which is the result of a normative shift toward greater accountability
for human rights violations.7 In the past, claims of sovereign rights
effectively shielded egregious human rights abusers from liability
for their crimes.8 Presently, the steady rise of trials, described by
Kathryn Sikkink as the “justice cascade,” has meant that crimes that
took place many years ago are being prosecuted for the first time
years, even decades, after they were committed.9 Particularly with
the increased resort to international criminal law, either through the
International Criminal Court, foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction, ad hoc tribunals created by the United Nations (UN), or
hybrid tribunals, instances in which truth commissions and courts
operate in the same space, simultaneously or in sequence, will likely
grow.10 Thus, the appropriate interface between TRCs and courts
Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein, & Jamie Rowen, Context, Timing and the
Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163 (2009).
5 Geoff Dancy & Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Timing, Sequencing, and Transitional
Justice Impact: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Latin America, 16 HUM. RTS. REV.
321 (2014).
6
See generally TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy
eds., 2004) (studying the use of truth commissions in a number of post-conflict
countries); see also ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that both the Argentine Sábato Commission and
Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission turned over their findings to the
courts).
7 KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS
ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 3 (2011) (highlighting the increase in prosecutions
worldwide).
8
BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 3 (2009) (“The most striking change is the fact that it is no longer
acceptable for a government to make sovereignty claims in defense of egregious
rights abuses.”).
9 SIKKINK, supra note 7.
10
Since states that have ratified the Rome Statute have expressly agreed to
either punish the perpetrators of international crimes or cede jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court to do so, criminal justice will be an inevitable component of any transitional justice process in these countries. See William A. Schabas,
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will continue to be a central question in transitional justice debates.
Emerging scholarship addressing this trend has tended to focus
on optimizing the order of transitional justice mechanisms.11 The
emphasis has been on whether the various sequencing of these mechanisms affects long-term outcomes, such as democratic consolidation and respect for human rights, but not on how their interaction
in practice might contribute to these goals.12
In an effort to fill that gap, as a Fulbright Scholar, I engaged in
original field research in Guatemala and Spain examining the interplay between the transitional justice mechanisms that were a response to Guatemala’s internal armed conflict. Over a span of six
months, I interviewed over two dozen judges, prosecutors, human
rights attorneys, and staff from the two Guatemalan TRCs. I also
obtained and reviewed the full record of the case brought in Spain
against the Guatemalan generals who were the alleged engineers of
numerous mass atrocities against the Mayan population in Guatemala. Most significantly, I am the first researcher to have collected
and analyzed the sentences in the cases before Guatemalan courts
that resulted in convictions for grave crimes committed during the
armed conflict. I reviewed all of these decisions with an eye toward
assessing how the findings and evidence from TRCs influenced judicial decision-making.
The Guatemalan transitional justice experience is illuminating
on this question because Guatemala employed a variety of transitional justice mechanisms to address the gross human rights violations that occurred during its thirty-six-year armed conflict. In the
immediate aftermath of the conflict, Guatemala opted for a UNbacked truth commission coupled with an amnesty law, which some
Introduction to TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH, supra note 6, at 1–2 (discussing the potential
influence of international institutions on TRCs in the post-conflict environment).
11
See, e.g., Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, & Andrew G. Reiter, The Justice
Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM.
RTS. Q. 980, 1005 (2010) (claiming that “delayed justice, or sequencing trials after
amnesties, allows for the justice balance that improves human rights and democracy”).
12 Elin Skaar, Cath Collins, & Jemima García-Godos, Analytical Framework, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 25, 28 (Elin Skaar, Jemima García-Godos, & Cath Collins
eds., 2016) (“In particular, although few countries have employed only a single
transitional justice in isolation, the existing literature rarely considers interaction
effects explicitly. Another key issue, often flagged but rarely explored fully in the
literature, is precisely how, rather than simply whether, timing and sequencing in
the adoption of TJMs affects medium- and long-term outcomes.”).
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believed were designed to ensure everlasting impunity. Skeptical of
the restrictive mandate of this truth commission, the Catholic
Church established its own independent truth commission that, unlike the UN-backed commission, named those responsible for grave
international crimes. At the same time, victims who viewed these
truth commissions as inadequate substitutes for justice continued to
push for prosecutions. Although a few low-level paramilitary officials were successfully convicted, the power that the perpetrators
still held in Guatemala made prosecutions of the high command of
the military politically infeasible.13 With time, however, prosecutions of the planners and organizers of crimes committed during the
armed conflict began to take place, first in Spain and now, strikingly,
in Guatemala; such prosecutions would have been unthinkable
when the crimes occurred some thirty years prior.
The Guatemalan experience illustrates the interdependence of
the two post-conflict strategies in practice: once thought to be antithetical to justice, “truth” has played a surprisingly important role
in these prosecutions. A close examination of the sentences in Guatemala reveals that justice has actually been “truth full,” with the
reports and other materials from truth commissions often being admitted into evidence. However, the normative force of truth commissions’ work in judicial decision-making has largely been overlooked in the context of transitional justice.14 Notably, the “truth”
13 Andrew N. Keller, To Name Or Not To Name? The Commission for Historical
Clarification in Guatemala, Its Mandate, and the Decision Not to Identify Individual Perpetrators, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 289, 297–301 (2001) (discussing the political compromise
of the CEH). The National Reconciliation Law provided some exceptions to the
amnesty. For example, enforced disappearances, genocide, torture, and other
crimes that do not have a statute of limitation could all still be prosecuted under
the law. Decreto No. 145 (1996), Ley de Reconciliation Nacional [National
Reconciliation Law], 54 Diario De Centro America (Guat.) (“La extinción de la
responsabilidad penal a que se refiere esta ley, no será aplicable a los delitos de
genocidio, tortura y desaparición forzada, así como aquellos delitos que sean
imprescriptibles o que no admitan la extinción de responsabilidad penal, de
conformidad con el derecho interno o los tratados internacionales ratificados por
Guatemala.”); see also Margaret Popkin, Guatemala’s National Reconciliation Law:
Combating Impunity or Continuing It?, 24 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 173, 173 (1997), http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/iidh/cont/24/dtr/dtr7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MT5-E6PR] (“[I]t may
still be nearly impossible to prosecute most of the worst crimes committed during
the armed conflict.”).
14 For a broader analysis of how the reports of non-judicial entities influence
judicial decision-making, see Pammela Quinn, Advancing the Conversation: Non-Judicial Voices and the Transnational Judicial Dialogue, in EXPERTS, NETWORKS, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (Holly Cullen, Joanna Harrington, & Catherine Renshaw
eds., 2017).
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presented in these reports established historical narratives around
which judges defined crimes and attributed responsibility, particularly to high-level officials. The truth commissions also helped to
diffuse international human rights norms at the local level.
The implications of these findings usher in a dramatically different way of conceptualizing transnational justice as pluralist. Drawing inspiration from the frame of legal pluralism and building off
emerging research in the political science arena on sequencing, I encourage lawyers and legal scholars to develop legal rules and judicial norms to facilitate the operation of various legal and quasi-legal
institutions in the same space.15 I argue that post-conflict pluralism
can be a vehicle for liberalization because it creates additional opportunities for norm diffusion and contestation. In addition, I caution policy-makers not to underestimate the value of “historical clarification” in advancing justice and creating roadmaps for
prosecutions that are strategic rather than scattershot. For this reason, I suggest that we should design transitional justice systems and
adopt judicial norms that encourage post-conflict pluralism.
In Section 2, I posit a theory that justice in post-conflict societies
should be a fundamentally pluralist endeavor and advocate that we
embrace multifaceted transitional justice, rather than try to recast it
within the truth-versus-justice paradigm. To set the stage for an
analysis of post-conflict pluralism in Guatemala, Section 3 provides
a more in-depth description of my methodology and essential background information, including the history of the internal armed conflict in Guatemala and a description of the various mechanisms and
methods that emerged to address grave crimes committed during
this period. Section 4 describes how the truth telling documented
by TRCs contributed to prosecutions in Guatemala and Spain. In
particular, I highlight how these truth commissions provided judges
with the necessary historical context to understand the nature of the
crimes, explained modus operandi, established the chain of command by exposing the organizational structure of the military, and
described the collective and enduring harm suffered because of the
crimes. In Section 5, using the example of Guatemala as a launching
point, I identify the specific ways in which truth commissions can
15 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2007)
(“[N]ormative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable
and might even sometimes be desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as
a site for discourse among multiple community affiliations.”).
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move the needle forward on justice, by diffusing international law,
recounting norm-shifting narratives, and acting in the place of fragile or compromised state institutions in the wake of mass atrocity.
2. THE MOVE TOWARD A PLURALIST CONCEPTION OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
Transitional justice scholars have long been on a quest for the
ideal mechanism or combination of mechanisms that will ensure the
long-term success of all post-conflict countries. Initially, discourse
on transitional justice emphasized that there was a choice to be made
between peace and justice in the periods of transition to democracy.
For instance, Samuel Huntington discussed the decision to “prosecute and punish or to forgive and forget.”16 Generally, advocates
who favored “peace,” in the form of amnesties and truth commissions, insisted that greater accountability could upset fragile negotiated peace agreements and lead to backlash.17 The general understanding was that TRCs were “a second-best alternative when trials
were seen as too destabilizing or politically infeasible.”18 Alternatively, those who favored “justice” argued that the rule of law could
not be established until wrongdoers were punished for their
crimes.19
Despite the focus on this dichotomy, in post-conflict countries,
transitional justice mechanisms rarely occurred in isolation.20 In
practice, they tend to be sequenced, or in a few cases, occur simultaneously.21 In a sense, transitional justice in post-conflict countries
16
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 211 (1991).
17 See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 2, at 43–44 (“Trials do little to deter
further violence and are not highly correlated with the consolidation of peaceful
democracy.”); see also Boot, supra note 2, at A34.
18
Schabas, Introduction, supra note 6, at 1. See also ROHT-ARRIAZA,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that
“the model of a ‘truth commission’ gained force as a ‘second-best option’ where
trials were deemed too destabilizing”).
19 See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 2540 (1991) (arguing that “the central
importance of the rule of law in civilized societies requires, within defined but principled limits, prosecution of especially atrocious crimes”).
20
Skaar et al., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 29
(noting that there is “an ever-expanding toolbox of transitional justice mechanisms”).
21 Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5.
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evolved faster than the scholarship did.22 As a consequence, at least
rhetorically, there is increasing recognition that justice and peace are
mutually re-enforcing. The UN has now adopted a multi-faceted
approach that combines measures to achieve justice, truth, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition.23 In his report on the rule of
law in post-conflict societies, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.”24 In
September 2009, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted
that “the debate is no longer between peace and justice, but between
peace and what kind of justice.”25 The European Union has stated
that it is “convinced that peace and justice are not contradictory aims
. . . [and] that lasting peace cannot be achieved without a suitable
response to calls for individuals to be held accountable for the most
serious international crimes.”26
The literature, particularly in the political science arena, has thus
shifted to examine whether there is an optimal sequencing of mechanisms that generate the best outcomes for democracy and human
rights.27 To some extent, however, the exploration of sequencing has
replayed the familiar truth versus justice debate. On one hand, some
believe that a slow approach to justice is best, with peace, generally
achieved via amnesties and truth commissions, being prioritized,
before any attempts at accountability are undertaken.28 Rather than
22 Alexander Dukalskis, Interactions in Transition: How Truth Commissions and
Trials Complement or Constrain Each Other, 13 INT’L. STUD. REV. 432, 432 (2011).
23 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary General:
United
Nations
Approach
to
Transitional
Justice
(Mar.
2010),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/57FH-W64B].
24
U.N. Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict
and post-conflict societies, 1, S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), https://undocs.org/S/2004/616 [https://perma.cc/K5H2-QL3Z].
25
Press Release, Secretary-General, Honoring Geneva Conventions, Secretary-General Says Debate ‘No Longer between Peace and Justice but between Peace
and What Kind of Justice,’ U.N. Press Release SG/SM/12494, (Sept. 26, 2009),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12494.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/5PBC-BYVM].
26 European Union Press Release 11900/08, Declaration by the Presidency on
Behalf of the EU to Mark the 10th Anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 16, 2008), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8025_en.htm [https://perma.cc/SU4W-ZQ38].
27 Skaar et al., supra note 12, at 28.
28 See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 4, at 212 (arguing that the “tortoises”
who have taken their time before pursuing criminal prosecutions have fared better
than the “hare” that rushed to judgment); Joanna R. Quinn, Chicken and Egg?
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rejecting justice wholesale, they argue that prosecutions should not
be attempted until the political transition has been stabilized. Others, like Human Rights Watch, warn that peace first, justice later, in
practice means no justice at all, which in their view will ultimately
undermine long-term stability.29
The tight hold of the truth-versus-justice debate, as evinced by
its current reverberations in the literature on sequencing, in part is a
result of the legal profession’s understanding of the law as linear
and insular. I contend that this need to choose emerges from our
narrow “jurispathic” conception of justice, in which law must be hierarchical and courts supreme.30 Those who believe most fervently
in the need for traditional notions of criminal responsibility in postconflict societies to take precedence reflect a kind of legal centralism.
Legal centralism is the idea that “law is and should be the law of the
state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions.”31 One of the precepts of
legal centralism is that “the state is the best or only hope for the realization of liberal democratic values, such as democracy, equality,
human rights, and the rule of law.”32 To legal centralists, all other
normative institutions are secondary and subordinate to the law and
institutions of the state.33
It is this conceptual hegemony of the state as the preeminent
Sequencing in Transitional Justice: The Case of Uganda, 14 INT’L J. OF PEACE STUD. 35, 37
(2009) (“It may well be that the cessation of hostilities needs to be a certainty before
embarking on a process of transitional justice.”); Lucy Hovil & Joanna R. Quinn,
Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda at 17–19 (Refugee Law
Project Working Paper No. 17, July 2005), http://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-17-peace-first-justice-later
[https://perma.cc/ML8X-JJQ4] (emphasizing the importance of ending the conflict
in Uganda first before determining what system of justice to impose). Similar arguments were made during the Review Conference for the Rome Statute in Kampala on June 2, 2010.
29 Human Rights Watch, Seductions of “Sequencing”: The Risks of Putting Justice
Aside for Peace (2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/18/seductions-sequencing [https://perma.cc/GAE8-TQYZ] (recognizing that countries in transition
or negotiating peace deals face difficult choices but also believing that neglecting
accountability for egregious crimes in the aftermath of concluding a peace agreement can be and often is detrimental to long-term stability).
30
Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 41
(1983).
31
William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 498 (2010) (quoting John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 3 (1986)).
32 Twining, supra note 31, at 499.
33 Griffiths, supra note 31, at 3.
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lawmaker and enforcer that, to some extent, limits further development of transitional justice. Those in favor of justice view truth commissions as nothing other than second-rate substitutes for criminal
prosecutions, thereby overlooking their important contributions to
the rule of law, which this Article documents. However, the legal
centralists’ reliance on the state warrants especially strong skepticism in post-conflict societies, where the state has perpetrated or acquiesced to violence.
Instead of being trapped in the dichotomies that have dominated
the field for decades, I urge transitional scholars and practitioners to
adopt a legal pluralism frame when conceptualizing and examining
transitional justice. Legal pluralists believe that legal centralism is
“a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion.”34 Instead, Griffiths claims,
“Legal pluralism is fact.”35 Legal pluralism is “a theory or system
that recognizes more than one ultimate substance or principle.”36
Legal pluralism accepts, and even champions, the benefits of multiple, overlapping legal or quasi-legal systems.37 Instead of seeking
harmonization and hierarchy, legal pluralism favors diversity in legal systems as a means to generate “alternative ideas and as a site
for discourse among multiple community affiliations.”38 Legal pluralism was first noted by anthropologists who documented how indigenous norm-setting institutions remained influential and sometimes dominant in post-colonial contexts even when the colonial
state authority actively tried to displace them.39 Sally Merry Engle
refers to this class of legal pluralism as “classic legal pluralism.”40
Political theorists have since observed that legal pluralism is not
limited to colonial contexts, where local norms conflicted or merged
with Western ones. In western societies, a host of norm-setting institutions ranging from churches to business associations may set
rules outside of the official state rulemaking process.41 Sally Engle
Merry explains that “nonstate forms of normative ordering are more
difficult to see” in societies without colonial pasts, but nevertheless

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Griffiths, supra note 31, at 4.
Id.
Twining, supra note 31, at 477.
Berman, supra note 15, at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 869, 872–74 (1988).
Berman, supra note 15, at 1172.
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present.42 In these contexts, legal pluralism “center[s] on a rejection
of the law-centered-ness of traditional studies of legal phenomena,
arguing that not all law takes place in the courts.”43 These more recent understandings of legal pluralism envision lawmaking and enforcing as much more porous, multi-directional, and non-hierarchical.44 So, by way of illustration, “the family and its legal order
are shaped by the state, but the state in turn is shaped by the family
and its legal order because each is a part of the other.”45
While legal pluralists have historically focused on the relationship between state and internal non-state law, more recently, in response to concerns about legal fragmentation in the global legal order, legal scholars have utilized legal pluralism as a helpful frame
for grappling with the growing number of international legal and
quasi-legal institutions.46 For example, Mark Drumbl applied legal
pluralism to international criminal justice when analyzing the interplay between international courts, ad hoc tribunals, hybrid courts,
and national courts.47 Applying legal pluralism to the international
arena more broadly, Paul Schiff Berman argued that the pluralist
“framework is essential if we are to more comprehensively conceptualize a world of hybrid legal spaces.”48 According to Berman, international law scholars have generally ignored hybridity in the law
and tried to situate disputes as either domestic or international. Rather, he contends that “the global legal system is an interlocking web
of jurisdictional assertions by state, international, and non-state normative communities.”49 Global legal pluralists thus examine how
local actors might either deploy, change, or resist international,
transnational, or non-state norms and how these norms may also be
transformed in the process.50 The emphasis is on the persuasive
power of these norm-setting institutions rather than how their

Merry, supra note 40, at 873.
Id. at 872–74.
44 Id. at 878.
45 Id. at 883.
46 William Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963
(2003); Paul Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225, 237
(2009).
47
Mark Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1295 (2005)
48 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 15, at 1159.
49 Id.
50 Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, supra note 46, at 232, 236.
42
43
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ranking in a legal hierarchy influences their coercive authority.51 So,
for example, global legal pluralism is at work when the findings of
a commission of inquiry spur legal activity in the domestic courts of
the abuser’s home country or when a nonbinding decision by the
International Court of Justice influences how state courts in the
United States rule on a case.52
The legal pluralism frame is also very instructive with regard to
transitional justice. Jaya Ramji-Nogales has used this frame when
discussing the need to incorporate local preference and indigenous
institutions into a pluralist transitional justice design.53 She believes,
as I do, that “competing visions of substantive justice will exist
within the affected society and the international community” and
that transitional justice design should aim to “incorporate, or at least
respond to, a variety of perspectives.”54 Similarly, using the transitional justice experiences of Argentina and Chile as examples, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow asserts that transitioning societies are not homogeneous and so employing pluralist processes, which provide for
different and simultaneous models of transitional justice, would
best account for diverse conditions on the ground.55 Building on this
point, I contend that in order to encapsulate all of these competing
instincts and impetuses as democratically as possible, transitional
justice should be inherently multifaceted and a blend of global and
local. The transitional justice process typically involves a variety of
local, national, and international actors all seeking to redress the violence and human rights abuses that occurred during periods of
armed conflict, civil strife, and repression. Adopting a pluralist approach to transitional justice takes the emphasis off prioritizing one
actor over another, which has been the primary focus of the literature on the truth versus justice debate and sequencing. Instead of
trying to determine an optimal order for transitional justice mechanisms, it places the focus on developing a set of principles and legal
51 Id. at 235 (“[I]n a world of plural normative assertions, one crucial question
will be whether the community’s articulation of norms is sufficiently persuasive to
convince those wielding coercive power to enforce such norms.”).
52 Id. at 234.
53 Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process
Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2010).
54 Id. at 4–5.
55 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Process Pluralism in Transitional/Restorative Justice:
Lessons from Dispute Resolution for Cultural Variations in Goals Beyond Rule of Law and
Democracy Development in Argentina and Chile, 3 INT'L J. CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT AND
RESOL. 1, 24 (2015).
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rules that facilitate their operation in practice.
Not only is this an important theoretical shift, but practically, it
has a leveling, perhaps even democratizing, effect. After mass atrocity, victims have different methods of healing and reintegrating back
into society. It is unlikely that any one mechanism would be enough
to satisfy all victims’ desires for justice and thereby promote reconciliation. This is because what reconciliation and justice mean is
highly dependent on who is answering the question. Reconciliation
is a difficult concept to nail down because it can occur on so many
different levels.56 At the micro level, reconciliation can occur between a perpetrator and a victim, or even within a perpetrator’s own
conscience.57 At the macro level, it could mean reconciliation between the victim community and the state that targeted it, or, alternatively, the civilian bystanders who were complicit in crimes.58
Similarly, justice in the transitional context evades definition.59
It can mean “many things to many survivors: for some it may be
criminal trials of political leaders, for others punishment of their
neighbor who killed a family member is most important, and some
may find justice in being able to return to one’s home and live in
peace.”60 In Guatemala, there are survivors who support criminal
56 John D. Ciorciari & Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Lessons from the Cambodian Experience with Truth and Reconciliation, 19 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 196 (2013) (“Reconciliation also lends itself to numerous definitions that vary and even compete
along several axes, including goals, subject, and scope.”); ROHT-ARRIAZA,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 12 (“Definitions
of reconciliation are still contested and murky, and the individual, community, and
polity aspects of such processes are still not well understood.”); Susan Kemp, The
Inter-Relationship between the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification and the
Search for Justice in National Courts 73, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS, supra note
6, at 73.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Roman David, What We Know about Transitional Justice: Survey and Experimental Evidence, 38 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. 151, 171 (2017) (“Research consistently shows that the meaning of justice in postconflict societies is a broad social
category that goes beyond the notion of legal justice. In particular, the meaning of
justice for victims includes individual, social, and political aspects of justice.”); See,
e.g., Michael Bratton, Violence, Partisanship and Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe, 49 J.
OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 353, 365 (2011) (asking the meaning of justice, respondents to a
survey conducted in Zimbabwe indicated that it meant fair treatment (38%), truth
telling, openness and transparency (17%), equality of socio-economic living standards (14%), and the rule of law (6%), while 19% of those surveyed said that they did
not know).
60 Laurel E. Fletcher, Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A Comment
on Challenges to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
51, 54 (2009).
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sanctions for those responsible and others who do not.61 This difference may affect the healing process. According to empirical evidence, testifying in a public forum is healing for some survivors, but
not others.62 Thus, I argue that, in order to incorporate all of these
differing perspectives, transitional justice should be inherently
multi-faceted. We should embrace pluralization of transitional justice and, as Jaya Ramji-Nogales has argued, design systems that plan
for it, not only because it is inevitable, but also because it is desirable.
The legal pluralist frame also helps take the focus off another
dichotomy that frequently appears in the literature: the relative merits of international versus national interventions. This recurring debate in the field centers on what role international actors should play
in transitional justice, which inevitably raises questions of what deference should be given to a sovereign’s decision to devise its own
transitional justice design. In other words, how universal is the notion that grave crimes warrant prosecution, regardless of its effect
on the political compromises made by the governing authorities to
achieve peace? When is it appropriate for the international community to step in with its own legal responses following mass atrocity?
The Universalist would say that we must strive to keep our systems
as uniform as possible and that this is best accomplished at the international level.63 The Sovereigntist would object, claiming that
this undermines the autonomy of nation-states, which is the foundation of our global legal order.64
Neither of these solutions is entirely satisfactory in transitioning
societies. Requiring that all transitional justice be done at the international level so that it is uniform is neither practicable nor desirable, especially at this moment, when international criminal justice is
facing its own crisis of confidence. In the last few years, the International Criminal Court has been accused of biased case selection, particularly by African nations. These critiques crescendoed in 2016
when the African Union began to develop a strategy for “collective
61
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, Human Rights Attorney, Impunity
Watch (Aug. 2, 2016) (“Hay víctimas que no están de acuerdo con una sanción, otras
sí.”).
62 See ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 1, at 5.
63 Berman, supra note 15, at 1165 (“Universalists, for their part, will chafe at
the idea that international norms should ever be subordinated to local practices that
may be less liberal or less rights-protecting.”).
64 Id. (“Sovereigntists will object to the idea that nation-states should ever take
into account international, transnational, or non-state norms.”).
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withdrawal from the ICC.”65 Moreover, even if it were desirable for
international criminal tribunals to be the main arena for prosecutions for crimes associated with mass atrocity, they currently lack
the capacity to do so.66 Indeed, in its sixteen years of operation, the
International Criminal Court has only convicted four defendants.67
Such a requirement would also conflict with the principle of complementarity, which provides that when justice can be done at the
local level, it should be.68
Alternatively, relying exclusively on local jurisdictions to prosecute crimes in which state actors or institutions may be implicated
at the highest levels may result in unequal punishment and even
impunity, as it did for many years in Guatemala. Indeed, one empirical study that examined seven post-conflict countries found that
domestic criminal prosecutions only progressed when there was intense UN involvement, regardless of whether they had strong or
weak internal legal systems.69
As Naomi Roht-Arriaza aptly put it, “two dimensions—national/international, or truth commission/trial—are no longer
enough to map the universe of transitional justice efforts.”70 As my
research suggests, in post-conflict societies, norms are shared and
diffused across a multiplicity of actors, be they truth commissions,
the national judiciary, the international community, or various
65
African Union Assembly Dec. 590(XXVI), A.U. Doc. EX.CL/952(XXVIII),
Decision on the International Criminal Court, at ¶ 10(iv) (Jan. 30, 2016),
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/29514-assembly_au_dec_588__604_xxvi_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8TJ-SMV9].
66
See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 53, at 7 (describing international criminal
courts incapability of trying “every individual who committed a crime in a situation
of mass violence”).
67 The International Criminal Court has only convicted three defendants and
acquitted two. For more information about these cases, see Defendants, INT’L. CRIM.
CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx.
68
See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 497 (2003) (explaining that “under the principle of complementarity, the
court must defer to national courts unless they are unable or unwilling to prosecute.”); See also Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity,
21 CRIM. L. F. 67, 72–81 (2010) (explaining that the text of Article 17 requires a twostep test and that the first step—the so-called “proceedings requirement” —is an
examination into whether a State is currently investigating or prosecuting the case
or has already done so).
69 Fletcher, et al., supra note 4, at 195 (“Only in countries with weak legal systems and intense UN involvement are criminal justice proceedings being instituted
against a limited set of perpetrators.”).
70
ROHT-ARRIAZA, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra
note 1, at 11.
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actors in civil society. Empirical research suggests that we should
embrace this reality. A recent study that examined the sequencing
of transitional justice mechanisms in Latin America found little evidence that there is one “optimal sequence” to promote democracy.71
Moreover, research in the political science arena has found that
“none of the transitional justice mechanisms on their own reduce
human rights violations or improve democracy.”72 Rather, only
combinations of transitional justice mechanisms have been found to
affect human rights and democracy positively.73 The only conclusive finding across studies is that criminal trials, when combined
with other mechanisms like amnesties and truth commissions, are
democracy-promoting, meaning that “successful democratic consolidation is almost never observed where trials have not been conducted.”74
While quantitative analysis of the effects of various combinations of transitional justice mechanisms on democracy and human
rights is now commonplace, at least among political scientists, how
such blending of mechanisms contributes to these long-term outcomes in practice has been undertheorized. Emerging scholarship
that addresses this trend has tended to focus on whether the various
sequencing of these mechanisms affect long-term outcomes, such as
democratic consolidation and sustained peace, but not on how their
interaction in practice might contribute to these goals.75 The scholarship that has focused on the relationship between truth commissions
and trials have primarily focused on the few countries where they
occurred simultaneously.76 Much less has been written about how
truth commissions and trials that are sequenced have been complementary in practice.77 Scholars have missed opportunities to
71
Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5, at 332 (“In a crude sense, this
suggests that there is not an optimal timing or sequencing of [transitional justice]
needed to promote democratic development.”).
72
Olsen, Payne & Reiter, supra note 11, at 996.
73 Id.
74 Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 5, at 340.
75 Skaar et. al., supra note 12, at 28.
76 William A. Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 15 CRIM. L. F. 3, 3–6 (2004)
(focusing on the example of Sierra Leone).
77
Skaar, et. al., supra note 12, at 28. But see Eduardo González Cueva, The
Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions, in
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS, supra note 6, at 55, 59–66 (2004) (highlighting the
cooperation between Peruvian truth commissions and the court system). See also
Susan Kemp, The Inter-Relationship between the Guatemalan Commission for Historical

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/4

2018]

Post-Conflict Pluralism

767

innovate systems that account for the pluralization of transitional
justice, and thus more effectively address the unique challenges that
transitioning societies face when trying to overcome their troubled
pasts.
This article attempts to fill this gap by drawing lessons from the
Guatemalan experience with transitional justice. Guatemala provides a compelling illustration of the promise that more integrated
and pluralist transitional justice systems might hold. Although
scholars mistakenly portray Guatemala as a country where truth
commissions preceded trials,78 as my research reveals, trials occurred prior to, concurrently with, and after the work of the truth
commissions. This makes it an interesting case study to explore the
various ways that trials and truth commissions might complement
each other in practice. My research suggests that the operation of
multiple legal or quasi-legal institutions can be particularly advantageous as a tool for liberalization, in that it can open up “spaces of
resistance” to counter the official state narrative or to disrupt a corrupt legal system.79 Furthermore, in lieu of imposing international
law on transitional countries through a positivist legal order at the
international level, allowing for norm diffusion through and across
various institutions is more likely to yield liberalizing results locally.
3. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA
In order to contextualize my later findings, a baseline understanding of the Guatemalan internal armed conflict and the transitional justice mechanisms set up to address atrocities committed
during that period is essential. Although there were many causes of
the internal armed conflict in Guatemala, any analysis of it would
be incomplete without placing it within the broader context of the
Cold War.80 In 1953, then President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán ushered
Clarification and the Search for Justice in National Courts, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS &
COURTS, supra note 6, at 67, 74 (2004) (considering the relationship between truth
commissions and criminal prosecutions).
78 See, e.g., Dukalskis, supra note 22, at 440 (stating that Guatemala conducted
a sequence of truth commissions followed by prosecutions); see also Fletcher et al.,
supra note 4, at 215 (stating that Guatemala “opted for truth commissions rather
than trials”).
79 Berman, supra note 15, at 1176.
80 See Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria Del Silencio, Capítulo primero: Causas y Orígenes del Enfrentamiento Armado Interno 98 (1999)
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in a wave of agrarian reforms in an effort to redistribute land.81 One
of his most controversial measures was to expropriate land that remained uncultivated. When Arbenz sought to repatriate land
owned by the United Fruit Company, a US-owned banana company, the United States, who with the backdrop of the Cold War was
predisposed to view Arbenz as a communist, began a covert CIA
operation to overthrow his government.82 In 1954, Carlos Castillo
Armas and a small army, who were trained by the CIA, led an invasion into the capital of Guatemala. While the attack objectively was
not a military success, it did succeed in putting enough pressure on
Arbenz that he ultimately resigned that year and a military government took over.83
Thereafter, the Guatemalan government instituted the National
Security Doctrine, a repressive anti-communist agenda developed
primarily in the United States that targeted the “internal enemy.”84
It was in this context that groups of leftist Guatemalans mobilized,
culminating in a failed uprising of leftist military officers on November 13, 1960.85 This date is seen as the start of Guatemala’s internal
armed conflict.
Although the political and military might of the guerilla groups
was limited, the State viewed this armed insurgency as a fundamental threat to their moderation project and so responded with brutal
force. At the time of the civil war, Guatemala was one of only a
handful of countries in Latin America to have an indigenous majority population and the government believed that this population
was stalling the country’s economic development.86 The Guatemalan government saw only two possibilities for the indigenous Mayan population: assimilation or elimination. This was confirmed by
the documents collected by the CEH. Otilia Lux de Cotí, one of the
three Commissioners of the CEH, explained to me that the CEH discovered correspondence dating as far back as the 1970s, containing
“assertions that the ‘indian’ is an element that does not permit development and that should either mix to become mestizo or be
[hereinafter CEH Report] (discussing the historical background that set the context
for the Guatemalan internal armed conflict).
81 Id. at 101–02.
82
Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, BITTER FRUIT: THE STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA (1999).
83 Id.
84 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 117–123.
85 Id. at 123.
86 Id. at 79.
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eliminated.”87 During the 1980s, considered the bloodiest period of
the conflict, the Guatemalan government, led by military strongmen, developed the so-called scorched earth campaign, in which
they razed entire villages and killed tens of thousands of people.88
The conflict continued until 1996 when the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
signed the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo de Paz
Firme and Duradera).89
3.1. The Commission for Historical Clarification
After considering the various options for how to address the
mass human rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict, Guatemala opted for amnesty and a truth commission.90 Although, under the national reconciliation law, amnesty did not exist
for international grave crimes such as genocide, torture, and forced
disappearances, many people still saw it as fostering impunity.91 In
addition, many human rights advocates viewed the truth commission as an inadequate substitute for justice.92 Describing the truth
commission as a “piñata of forgiving,” Francisco Goldman, a Guatemalan writer, put into words the feelings of many at the time: that
the peace agreement and accompanying amnesties were a surrender
made by ladinos rather than the true victims of the armed conflict,
87
Interview with Otilia Lux de Cotí, CEH Commissioner (Dec. 13, 2017)
(“Existían comunicados de los años 70 que contenían afirmaciones como ‘el indio’
es un elemento que no permite el desarrollo de Guatemala, el cual debe mezclarse
y convertirse en mestizo, o debe eliminarse.”)
88 PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 32 (Routledge ed., 2nd ed. 2011).
89
Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, Guat.-URNG, Dec. 29, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 274.
90 HAYNER, supra note 88, at 32.
91 National Reconciliation Law, Article 8, Decreto numero 145-1996, Dec. 27,
1996; Interview with Naomi Roht-Arriaza (Nov. 14, 2017).
92 Jemima García-Godos & Luis Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on
Trial, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE UNEVEN ROAD FROM IMPUNITY
TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 12, at 205 (“[T]he insurgency gradually lost
popular support in the course of the negotiations, in part because the accords it
signed were widely perceived as weak in their response to popular demands for
justice… The accord [which created the CEH] generated disillusionment within social movements and the human rights sector for its provision that ‘the Commission
shall not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations
and report nor shall these have any judicial aim or effect . . .”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

770

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3

the indigenous Mayan population.93 As he put it, “[t]he Guatemalan
Armed Forces and the guerrillas have negotiated a law forgiving
themselves for 36 years of crimes that sear the heart and stupefy the
mind, and are asking their fellow citizens to believe that this is the
gateway to the rule of law in a new democratic society.”94
The resulting UN-backed truth commission, the Commission for
the Historical Clarification (or CEH, for its Spanish acronym), was
established by a peace agreement between the Guatemalan military
government and the guerilla that was reached in Oslo on June 23,
1994.95 In the preamble of the agreement, the parties recognized that
“the people of Guatemala have a right to know the whole truth concerning these events, clarification of which will help avoid a repetition of these sad and painful events and strengthen the process of
democratization in Guatemala.”96 The agreement specified that its
goal was to clarify objectively, equally, and impartially the human
rights violations and the acts of violence that caused the suffering of
the Guatemalan population during the armed conflict.97 It would
also formulate “recommendations that will facilitate peace and national harmony in Guatemala,” in particular by suggesting
measures to preserve the memory of the victims, fostering a culture
of mutual respect, and strengthening the democratic process.98 It
“was not instituted to judge, which is the role of the tribunals, but
instead to clarify the history of what occurred during more than
three decades of fratricidal war.”99 The agreement also specified
that the work of the CEH would begin with the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace and would continue for six
months with a possibility to extend for six months more if the CEH
wished.100 Due to the extensive investigative period and the
93 Francisco Goldman, In Guatemala, All is Forgotten, NY TIMES (Dec. 23, 1996)
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/23/opinion/in-guatemala-all-is-forgotten.html [https://perma.cc/XRB6-MXBK].
94 Id.
95 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 15.
96 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human
Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, June 23, 1994, UN Doc. A/48/954/S/1994/751, Annex II, Preamble,
¶
2,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_940623_EstablishmentCommissionClarifyPastHumanRig
htsViolations.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8R3-S9F7] [hereinafter Oslo Accord].
97 CEH Report, supra note 80, at 15.
98 Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 15.
100 Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2.
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territorial and social complexities in which the CEH had to work,
the CEH decided to extend its work for the additional six months
allowed by the Oslo Agreement.101
The agreement further specified that the CEH “could not individualize responsibility or have judicial goals or effects.”102 The
CEH interpreted this provision to mean that the CEH was only
meant to clarify history and not to serve as or to take the place of a
criminal proceeding.103 Furthermore, after examining the “literal,
historical, teleological, and systematic interpretation of the term ‘to
not individualize responsibility,’” the CEH concluded that it did not
have the authority to identify the names of those responsible for human rights violations.104 For that reason, the CEH did not name
names of individuals in the text of the report; however it did attribute institutional responsibility for grave crimes.105 At the same time,
the CEH concluded that, even though it was not a judicial body and
its conclusions did not have legal effect, nothing prevented the Guatemalan government, particularly its judicial system, from relying
on the information contained in the report.106 The report further
stipulated that citizens, including victims and their family members,
had the right to bring legal actions in relation to the case studies described in the report.107
3.1.1. The Composition of the CEH
The Oslo Agreement provided that the CEH would have three
members: 1) the moderator of the peace negotiations, 2) a Guatemalan citizen of “irreproachable conduct,” and 3) an academic proposed by the university rectors.108 In the end, the moderator of the
peace negotiations persuaded Christian Tomuschat, who was the
rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission on the human
rights situation in Guatemala from 1990 to 1993, to take his place as
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 41.
Id. at 24 (“[L]os trabajos, recomendaciones e informe de la Comisión no
individualizaran responsabilidades, ni tendrán efectos o propósitos judiciales.”).
103 Id. at 42.
104 Id. at 44.
105 Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2.
101
102
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the only foreign Commissioner on the CEH.109 In addition to these
three Commissioners, the CEH had a staff of 273 professional, including 142 Guatemalans and 131 from other countries.110
The CEH adopted a strategy of “territorial deployment,” by establishing offices in the interior of the country and prioritizing those
areas most affected by the armed conflict, in order to make it easier
for Guatemalans to access their office and to give testimony.111 In
total, the CEH established four sub-headquarters and ten regional
offices.112 From the regional offices, the CEH investigators would
travel to the municipalities and communities of every department of
the country in order to inform them directly or indirectly (through
NGOs, formal officials, and traditional leaders) about the mandate
of the CEH.113
In total, CEH investigators visited 2,000 communities, collected
500 collective testimonies, and registered 7,338 individual testimonies.114 The CEH promised everyone who spoke with them that they
would not reveal their identities.115 According to Denis Martinez,
who was an employee of the CEH, there was a standard script for
each interview that detailed what the CEH was, its purpose, the
guarantee of confidentiality, and that participation was voluntary
and not compensated.116 He also relayed that the questions they
asked resembled what the Attorney General’s office uses today to
document an alleged criminal incident.117 It included sections for
consent, general demographic information about the declarant, such
as where they were born and their age, and the complete information about the criminal incident, including the date of the incident, the victims, what violation occurred (e.g. rape, extrajudicial
killing, torture, etc.), and who they believed was responsible.118 This
information was then inputted into a database, which the American
109
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, UN Human Rights Commission
Rapporteur (Oct. 11, 2016).
110
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 31.
111
Id. at 32.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 32–33.
114
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 33.
115
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.
116
Interview with Denis Martinez, CEH employee (Aug. 12, 2016).
117
Id. (“[E]ra un formulario similar a los que utiliza el Ministerio Público para
documentar un incidente.”)
118
Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116; see also CEH Report, supra
note 80, at ¶ 188.
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Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), at the CEH’s
request, later analyzed to come up with specific statistics for each
violation.119 Their methodology is detailed in the annex of the CEH.
Sociologists and other non-lawyers complained that the interview
process was so rigid that it did not permit them to document the
voices of the people.120 Another challenge reported to me was that
the Mayan translators did not have any formal training in translation, which complicated the interview process.121
In order to ensure the confidentiality of those who gave testimony, the CEH coded all of its interviews so that each interview was
assigned a unique number and all identifying information was removed from the interview notes.122 For this reason, the CEH also
decided to send its archives to the UN headquarters in New York
City.123 The CEH estimated that it collaborated with more than
20,000 individuals who provided information to the CEH, including
more than 1,000 “key witnesses,” who were members of the military,
members of the civil defense patrols (or PACs, as they are known by
their Spanish acronym), military commissioners, politicians, combatants in the guerrilla, intellectuals, labor leaders, and members of
civil society.124 However, according to Christian Tomuschat, none
of the alleged perpetrators came forward to testify.125 At the same
time, he and Otilia Lux both said that they had a lengthy interview,
lasting three or four hours, with Benedicto Lucas García, the former
chief of staff of the military during the worst periods of the conflict
who is currently on trial for enforced disappearance in the
CREOMPAZ case and was recently convicted of crimes against humanity, aggravated sexual assault, and enforced disappearance in
the Molina Theissen case.126 However, he evaded all of their questions.127
119
Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116 (explaining that instead of
inputting names of those responsible, the statisticians inputted what group they
belonged to, such as the military, para-military, special forces, etc.).
120
Interview with Denis Martinez, supra note 116 (“La queja de los sociólogos
o los que no eran abogados, era que no permitía documentar las palabras de la
gente…”)
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 33.
124
Id. at 33–34.
125
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.
126
Id; Interview with Otilia Lux de Cotí, supra note 87.
127
Id.
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The CEH also consulted thousands of pages of documents submitted by diverse organizations from civil society, including military documents that the United States government had declassified.128 Christian Tomuschat explained that the Commission had
also asked the Guatemalan Government to access its military archives, but the military forces “lied blatantly, saying that there were
no archives at all. It came out later that there were so many documents.”129 In his view, the Guatemalan Government did not actively
obstruct the work, but did not cooperate with the CEH.130
According to its report, the CEH’s principal purpose was “to create a record of the recent bloody past of Guatemala.”131 The CEH
hoped that “the truth would lead to reconciliation, and that, in fact,
confronting the truth is an essential step to arriving at reconciliation.”132 Moreover, it said, “knowing the truth about what happened would make it easier to achieve national reconciliation, so
that Guatemalans could in the future live in an authentic democracy,
without forgetting that the rule of law has been and continues to be
the primary demand to create a new state.”133 The report also underscored that “[r]econciliation is not possible without justice.”134
The Oslo Agreement did not itself make reference to reparations
or assistance to the victims.135 However, the “Acuerdo sobre Bases
para la Incorporacion de la URNG a la Legalidad” in paragraph 19 established that the entity in charge of reparations and assistance to
victims should “take into account the recommendations formulated
by the CEH.”136
3.1.2. The Judicial Foundation used by the CEH
The CEH took the reference to human rights in the Oslo Agreement to mean international human rights norms, commenting that
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 16.
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.
130
Id.
131
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 16. (“El propósito principal del Informe es
dejar constancia del reciente pasado sangriento de Guatemala.”)
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 17.
135
Id. at 43.
136
Id.
128
129
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“it is only through international rules and principles that we are able
to measure objectively the distortions and perversions suffered by
the national legal order, at least partially, under different military
governments.”137 It therefore based its findings on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which it considered customary international law, as well as international treaties, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
which was in force during the armed conflict.138 In addition, although the Oslo Agreement did not mention international humanitarian law, the CEH believed that it applied because its aim is to protect human rights in wartime.139 Specifically, the CEH concluded
that Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 applied to both the military and the guerilla groups.140 More controversially, the CEH found that the Additional Protocol II, which Guatemala had only ratified in 1987 and insisted did not apply, was
enforceable because its rules formed a part of customary international law.141 The CEH also took into account national law, particular the various Constitutions in effect during the internal armed conflict, finding that the Guatemalan government violated its duty to
respect and protect the right to life either through its direct action or
with its knowledge and acquiescence.142
The CEH registered 42,275 victims, of whom over 23,000 were
victims of arbitrary executions and over 6,000 were victims of disappearances.143 Of those registered victims, 83% were Mayan and 17%
were Ladino.144 Overall, the CEH estimated that over 200,000 people
were killed during the armed conflict, around 90 percent of them by
the military.145 It also estimated that there were around 40,000

Id. at 45.
Id. Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the armed
conflict began. Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9J4D3W3].
139
CEH Report, supra note 80, at ¶¶ 71–72.
140
Id. at 46, ¶¶ 73 & 75
141
Id. at ¶ 74.
142
Id. at 46-47, ¶¶ 77 & 78.
143
Id. at 21 (Conclusiones y Recomendaciones, Capítulo cuarto: Conclusiones).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 16 (Capítulo segundo: Las violaciones de los derechos humanos y los
hechos de violencia).
137
138
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victims of enforced disappearance.146 The CEH also concluded that
the military committed “genocidal acts” in four specific areas, including the Ixil region.147 It further concluded that the majority of
atrocities were perpetrated in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In February 1999, the CEH publicly presented its report to approximately 10,000 people who attended a grand ceremony in Guatemala City. When the head of the CEH, Christian Tomuchat, announced its finding that the majority of human rights violations
were committed by national security forces, the audience began to
chant: “Justice! Justice!”148 Upon hearing the CEH’s conclusion, Álvaro Arzú, the President of Guatemala at that time who was supposed to receive the report, excused himself from his table and left
the ceremony without formally accepting the report.149 About a
week later, the government took out advertisements in various news
outlets disputing that the CEH report represented the true story of
the armed conflict.150
3.2. The Catholic Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory Project
The CEH built off the work of the Recovery of Historical
Memory Project of the Catholic Church’s Human Rights Office
(REMHI), an effort begun by the Human Rights Office of the Guatemalan Archbishop (or ODHAG for its acronym in Spanish), which
was created in October of 1994, the same year that CEH received its
mandate from the United Nations.151 ODHAG created REMHI in
part due to the skepticism about CEH from human rights activists
and the founder of ODHAG, Bishop Juan Gerardi, who believed that
the CEH would not go far enough since its mandate explicitly prohibited it from assigning guilt to perpetrators and from having “any
Id. at 73 (Mandato y Procedimiento de Trabajo).
Id.
148
Se presenta informe Guatemala, memoria del silencio en 1999, PRENSA LIBRE
(Feb. 26, 1999), http://www.prensalibre.com/hemeroteca/se-presenta-informeguatemala-memoria-del-silencio-en-1999.
149
Id.
150
García-Godos & Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on Trial, supra
note 92, at 208.
151
HAYNER, supra note 88, at 33–34 (noting that REMHI collected thousands
of statements through trained local interviewers); RECUPERACIÓN DE LA MEMORIA
HISTÓRICA, OFICINA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DEL ARZOBISPADO DE GUATEMALA,
GUATEMALA: NUNCA MÁS 19 (1998) [hereinafter REMHI Report].
146
147
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judicial aim or effect.”152 The directors hoped that REMHI, which
did not have the same time constraints as CEH and was able to name
names, could lay the groundwork for CEH to be more effective in its
work.153 According to the leadership of REMHI, who I interviewed,
REMHI was also meant to be a resource for victims who wanted to
bring cases (though some of the human rights attorneys I interviewed were unaware of this objective).154 However, at the time,
Edgar Gutierrez, the General Coordinator of REMHI, did not believe
that justice would ever be possible.155
Despite this internal objective, externally, REMHI was portrayed
as a historical preservation project. Indeed, in the introduction to
REMHI, the Archbishop of Guatemala at the time, Monsignor Prospero Penados del Barrios, stated that its official purpose was “to preserve the historical memory of political violence and document the
gravest violations of human rights of people and indigenous communities during the thirty-six year fratricidal conflict, which produced extreme social polarization.”156 The project was designed to
create a space, even if limited, where those who gave their testimony
could feel recognized and supported.157 Everything from how the
interviews were conducted to the training of the interviewers and
the instruments used to gather information were devised to facilitate
that goal.158
152
See FRANCISCO GOLDMAN, THE ART OF POLITICAL MURDER 5 (2007) (describing Bishop Gerardi’s skepticism towards the UN Historical Clarification Commission). See also Oslo Accord, supra note 96, at 2. (“Los trabajos, recomendaciones e
informe de la Comisión no individualizarán responsabilidades, ni tendrán
propósitos o efectos judiciales.”); Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, General
Coordinator of REMHI (July 25, 2016).
153
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese
Coordinator of REMHI who wishes to remain anonymous (July 27, 2016) (Recording of interview on file with author).
154
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153; Interview with Mynor Alvarado, Legal Director of Grupo Apoyo Mutuo (Aug. 17, 2016) (Recording of interview on file with
author).
155
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152.
156
REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 19 (“. . . preservar la memoria histórica
sobra la violencia política, las gravísimas violaciones a los derechos humanos de las
personas y comunidades indígenas durante estos treinta y seis anos de lucha
fratricida que produjo una polarización social sin limites.”)
157
Id. at 23 (“La conducción de las entrevistas, la preparación de los
animadores y el uso de los instrumentos de recogida de información se orientaron
a tratar de generar un espacio que, aunque limitado, supusiera un reconocimiento
y apoyo para los declarantes.”)
158
Id.
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REMHI was staffed by pastoral teams from eleven dioceses
(with one declining to participate) that focused mainly on the rural
areas of the country, which were isolated due to the limited access
to modes of communication and the diverse Mayan languages spoken there.159 Its link to the Catholic Church was essential to its success.160 Mayan Guatemalans, deeply fearful of outsiders, especially
after the extreme repression and violence of the armed conflict,
trusted the church because it was already established in their communities and had been a safe haven for many during the worst years
of the war.161 This was crucial because REMHI collected its testimony at a time when political tension was still high and both military and paramilitary forces were still active.162 Indeed, some of the
people interviewed did not know that the armed conflict had
ended.163
In the central office, REMHI had five research teams, each with
a different theme or focus, including socio-psychological, cultural,
gender, legal and social historical.164 Over two years, REMHI
trained six to eight hundred people in how to interview and collect
testimony.165 The interviewers were people from the local communities where they worked and were selected by representatives from
the communities and religious sectors.166 The selection criteria for
the position included the ability to listen and communicate, having
the trust and recognition of the community, and dedication to confidentiality and continuity of the work.167
The interviewers worked out of thirteen regional centers and
conducted over half of their interviews in fifteen different Maya

Id. at 19; GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 7.
REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 21.
161
Id.
162
REMHI,
Metodologia
de
Investigacion
(Apr.
6,
2013),
http://www.remhi.org.gt/portal/metodologia-de-investigacion/
[https://perma.cc/4PA2-KBL5] [hereinafter REMHI Methodology]
163
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152.
164
REMHI Methodology, supra note 162.
165
HAYNER, supra note 88, at 33–34 (noting that REMHI “collected thousands
of statements by training over six hundred local interviewers and working through
church networks”). But see GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 6 (describing how according to Bishop Geradi, REMHI had trained over 800 people over two years).
166
REMHI Methodology, supra note 162.
167
Id. (“Entre los criterios de selección estaban: capacidad de escucha y
comunicación; confianza y reconocimiento de la gente de la comunidad;
compromiso de confidencialidad y continuidad en el trabajo.”).
159
160
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languages and the rest in Spanish.168 In order to compare the testimony given across the country, the interviewers all asked the same
seven questions:
1) What happened?
2) When and where?
3) Who was responsible?
4) What effects did the act have in your life?
5) What did you do to deal with the act?
6) Why do you think that it happened?; and
7) What needs to happen in order for the acts not to
reoccur?169
REHMI collected testimony for six months. As Edgar Gutiérrez,
the coordinator of REMHI, explained to me, in smaller villages
where everyone knows each other, some people did not want their
community to know that they went to the church to give testimony.170 Therefore, REMHI paid for radio announcements, in
which they invited witnesses to go to other communities to give
their testimony.171 These interviews were recorded and/or transcribed and are now available at ODHAG upon request.172 According to all of the former staff of REMHI with whom I spoke, there
were never any reprisals against people who gave their testimony.173
Similar to CEH, REMHI also interviewed key witnesses through
another procedure.174 These people were not necessarily victims;
GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 6.
REMHI Methodology, supra note 162 (“Para facilitar la comparabilidad de
los testimonios y la conducción de las entrevistas se estructuró una metodología
basada en siete preguntas para la recogida de testimonios: ¿qué sucedió?, ¿cuando
y dónde?, ¿quienes fueron los responsables?, ¿qué efectos tuvo ese hecho en su
vida?, ¿qué hizo para enfrentarlo?, ¿por qué cree que pasó? y ¿qué habría que hacer
para que no volviera a suceder?”).
170
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152.
171
Id.
172
HAYNER, supra note 88, at 34.
173
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153.
174
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152.
168
169
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instead REMHI sought them out for their knowledge of a community, the period when the acts occurred, or the structure of the military.175 In some instances, the person interviewed had personal
knowledge of atrocities committed because they were part of the
military.176
Because of the strong desire of the victims to find the remains of
their relatives who were missing, REMHI created the first forensic
team to exhume clandestine mass graves in Guatemala. Since the
Guatemala government did not have its own forensic team, the Attorney General’s office signed contracts with organizations like
ODHAG to gather forensic evidence for its cases.177
In April 1998, REMHI’s work culminated in the release of Guatemala, Nunca Mas!, a four-volume, 1,400 page report that, unlike
CEH, identified the individuals responsible for mass atrocities.178
The report named over 50,000 individuals who were killed during
the armed conflict (representing about a quarter of the total fatalities) and documented 410 massacres.179 It also concluded that the
majority of the massacres occurred from 1981 to 1983 (though some
occurred as late as 1995) and that the Guatemalan Army and the
PACs were responsible for 80% of the killings of civilians whereas
the guerillas were responsible for less than 5%.180 The REMHI report
also analyzed the pattern and practice of the crimes committed during the war as well as both their immediate and lasting impact on
individuals and communities.181 Additionally, direct testimony
from victims and perpetrators from both sides of the conflict regarding human rights violations and their lasting effects of the events
was described throughout the report.182
When the report was released, no high level Guatemalan officer
had been convicted or imprisoned for human rights violations perpetrated during the war.183 Bishop Gerardi made it clear, however,
that the evidence REMHI gathered would be available to those

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
Id.
GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 4–5.
Id. at 22.
Id.
REMHI Report, Volume I: Impactos de la Violencia, supra note 151.
GOLDMAN, supra note 152, at 22.
Id. at 25.
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seeking justice against military officials or the guerillas.184 REMHI
also shared its database with CEH, which it used in its calculations
to estimate the total numbers of people killed or disappeared and
confirm overall patterns.185
Although the heads of REMHI saw the fight for justice as the
next phase of REMHI and hoped that the dissemination of the report
would encourage victims to press for trials, the brutal murder of
Bishop Gerardi the day after the release of the report put a grinding
halt to those plans for about three years.186 According to Edgar
Gutiérrez, everyone was scared.187 The victims wondered, if the perpetrators did that to a bishop, what they would do to them.188
3.3. Prosecutions of International Crimes in Guatemala and Spain
Although a few low level paramilitary officials were successfully
convicted, the power that the perpetrators still held in Guatemala,
formally and informally, caused prosecutions of the high command
of the army, those who principally planned and organized the mass
atrocities and other human rights violations, to stall.189 Realizing
that prosecutions in Guatemala were infeasible, on December 2,
1999, Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú filed a complaint with
the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, using the precedent of a similar case
against former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet and a Spanish
statute that provided universal jurisdiction for international grave
crimes regardless of where they occurred.190 The complaint alleged
Id.
HAYNER, supra note 88, at 34. For more information about the database,
see GUATEMALA: NUNCA MAS, http://www.remhi.org.gt/bd/.
186
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Keller, supra note 13, at 297–301; Decreto No. 145, Ley de Reconciliation
Nacional [National Reconciliation Law], supra note 13; Popkin, supra note 13.
190
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions
and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict Guatemala,
9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 79, 79 n.3 (2008) (“The Audiencia Nacional hears cases involving
drug smuggling, terrorism, state corruption, and international crimes that cannot
adequately be dealt with at the level of provinces and autonomous communities.
Although divided into chambers, it is roughly equivalent to a US district court.”).
Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Almudena Bernabeu, Many Roads to Justice: Transnational
Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-conflict Guatemala, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: VOICES FROM LATIN AMERICA
184
185
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that eight former military or government officials, including Efraín
Ríos Montt and Benedicto Lucas García, were responsible for torture, genocide, terrorism, assassination, and illegal detention between 1978 and 1986.191 The criminal acts described in the complaint
included the bombing of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in
1980, which killed thirty-seven people, as well as the extrajudicial
killing of Spanish and other foreign priests and relatives of the complainant, Rigoberta Menchu.
Manuel Ollé Sese, the lead attorney on the case, told me that he
was afraid to bring the case in Spain because, at the time, there were
many judges and prosecutors who wanted to see universal jurisdiction undone.192 At first, he hesitated to be part of the case, because
he feared that they would use it to do away with universal jurisdiction altogether.193 In the end, it was not Spain who undermined the
case, but Guatemala. In a groundbreaking decision in 2005, the
Spanish Constitutional Court held that its universal jurisdiction statute granted the Spanish judiciary jurisdiction over international
crimes even when there was no nexus to Spain.194 Thus, the case
forged ahead until December 12, 2007, when the Guatemalan Constitutional Court decided that it would not honor the Spanish arrest
warrants or extradition requests. The court held that Spanish courts
did not constitute a “competent authority” because Spain’s effort to
exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes that occurred in Guatemala was unacceptable and an affront to Guatemala's sovereignty.195
Nonetheless, Guatemalan human rights attorneys continued to
push ahead with numerous cases against the high command of the
Guatemalan military in their national courts. These efforts culminated in 2012, when Ríos Montt was brought before a Guatemalan
court on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity for his
role in the massacre of Ixil villages in 1982.196 This was the first time
AND SPAIN

184, 188 (Jessica Almqvist & Carlos Esposito, eds., 2012).
Guatemalan Generals Case, Complaint filed by Rigoberta Menchú with
the Juzgado Central de Instrucccion de Guardia de la Audiencia National in Spain,
Dec. 2, 1999 (on file with author) [hereinafter Spanish Complaint].
192
Interview with Manuel Ollé Sese, Lead Attorney of the Guatemalan Generals Case (Oct. 26, 2016) (Interview notes on file with author).
193
Id.
194
Guatemalan Generals Case, Tribunal Constitucional, STC 237/2005, Sept.
26, 2005 [hereinafter Spanish Constitutional Court Decision].
195
Id.
196
See generally JUDGING A DICTATOR: THE TRIAL OF GUATEMALA’S RÍOS MONTT,
OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/judging-dictator-trial-guatemala-s-rios-montt [https://perma.cc/F2N5191
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that a former head of state had been tried for genocide in his own
country.197 This widely publicized case is only part of the dramatic
judicial awakening occurring in Guatemala, which has much to
teach us about the value of international law at the local level. Over
the past decade, there has been a litany of convictions of the high
military command responsible for grave international crimes in
Guatemala. Such prosecutions would have been unthinkable some
thirty years back when the crimes occurred.
4. THE BLENDING OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE

4.1. Methodology
In order to determine how truth and justice might be complementary, I engaged in original field research for this article beginning in June 2016. The first phase of my research focused primarily
on library research and document analysis. With the guidance of
my host institutions, the University of San Carlos in Guatemala and
the Autonomous University of Madrid in Spain, I engaged in intensive research to familiarize myself with the legal systems of Guatemala and Spain, focusing in particular on their rules of criminal procedure and evidence at the trial level. I also obtained authorization
from Judge Víctor Hugo Herrera Ríos to attend hearings in a case
involving the enforced disappearance of a fourteen year-old teenager named Marco Antonio Molina Theissen and from Judge Claudette Domínguez to review the court proceedings in a pending case
involving crimes uncovered as the result of the exhumation of a
mass grave at a former military base called CREOMPAZ. Following
these two ongoing cases deepened my understanding of the Guatemalan judicial system.
Additionally, with assistance from Guatemalan and Spanish
judges, prosecutors, and human rights attorneys, I also obtained
LM62] (describing the trial of Ríos Montt).
197
Ted Piccone and Ashley Miller, Rios Montt Trial an Example of National, International Courts Working Together, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (June 4, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/rios-montt-trial-an-example-of-nationalinternational-courts-working-together/ [https://perma.cc/52AU-9JXK] (“The
trial of Ríos Montt, de facto president from 1982-1983, represents the first time a
national judiciary has tried a former head of state for the crime of genocide in his
home country.”).
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copies of the trial sentences in the cases related to the armed conflict
in which there have been convictions, as well as the complete record
of the Guatemalan Generals case brought in Spain. Because of the extraordinary difficulty of obtaining access to these cases, I am the first
person to have compiled and analyzed all of these primary documents.198
In tandem with completing an in-depth review of these legal
documents, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the Guatemalan and Spanish prosecutors as well as the attorneys from human
rights organizations that assisted them. These interviews helped me
understand why REMHI and CEH were critical to them as they built
their cases. Significantly, I was also able to interview many of the
Guatemalan and Spanish judges who oversaw the cases involving
human rights abuses committed during the armed conflict. In addition, I interviewed the professional staff and leadership of CEH and
REMHI in order to learn firsthand about the practices they employed when collecting evidence as well as the procedures they put
in place to preserve evidence and protect those who offered testimony.
Overall, I interviewed three Guatemalan judges (including
Judge Miguel Ángel Gálvez Aguilar), both of the Spanish investigating judges (Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco and Judge Santiago
Pedraz), four employees of CEH (including Christian Tomuschat
and Otilia Inés Lux de Cotí, two of the three Commissioners), two
directors of REMHI, the former Attorney General of Guatemala
(Claudia Paz y Paz), the current and former head of the war crimes
unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s office (Hilda Pineda and
Orlando Lopez), the former head of the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala (Carlos Castresana), five attorneys
who acted as private prosecutors in the Spanish case, the Legal Director of the International Foundation of Baltasar Garzón (FIBGAR),
the current public prosecutor in Spain’s Attorney General’s Office in
198
Although all of Guatemalan sentences are technically public, the taboo nature of the cases and the decentralization of the courts that processed them made
accessing them remarkably challenging. To obtain copies of the sentences, I traveled long distances on dirt roads to courts or human rights organizations in remote,
rural areas of Guatemala. Because some courts did not have ready access to copiers,
I took pictures of the decisions, some hundreds of pages long, with my phone or
iPad. I also often had to approach multiple sources to obtain them. Accessing them
is so challenging that even the current head of the war crimes unit in Guatemala
City said that she does not have access to them all, in part because local jurisdictions
will not share them with her. Interview with Hilda Pineda, Head of the War Crimes
Unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office (Nov. 22, 2016).
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charge of prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases, an investigator at
ODHAG, the Director and co-founder of the Guatemalan Forensic
Anthropology Foundation (Fredy Peccerelli), the Director of the
Myrna Mack Foundation (Helen Mack), the Director of Center for
Legal Action on Human Rights (Juan Francisco Soto), and human
rights attorneys from five Guatemalan human rights organizations
who actively participated in the prosecutions in Guatemala under
the designation of quellrantes adhesivos.
4.2. Justice in the TRC Reports
While the common perception of Guatemalan transitional justice
is that prosecutions for grave human rights violations are a relatively recent advent, there were a few early cases, which had a notable impact in Guatemala. Indeed, through my fieldwork, I was
able to document eleven cases in which there were convictions that
pre-date the CEH and REMHI.
While REHMI contained scant references to the various cases
that pre-date it, the CEH referenced these cases throughout its report. For example, the CEH noted that in 1991 human rights and
impunity became part of the national discussion because of the cases
involving the assassinations of Myrna Mack and Michael Devine.199
In particular, it noted that the Myrna Mack case, which was brought
against both the low level officials who committed the crime and the
high level officials who planned it, opened a new front in the fight
for human rights that was quickly supported by different sectors of
the social movement for human rights.200 The report noted that in
both cases, the government argued it could not guarantee human
rights while it was also fighting an armed conflict.201
The CEH relied on these cases to come to various conclusions
about the efficacy of the Guatemalan judiciary during the armed
conflict. Using the Mack case as an illustration, the CEH concluded
that judicial proceedings were marred with irregularities and negligence. Specifically, it described how the Ministry of Defense
blocked access to information needed to adjudicate the Mack case,
and the court did not apply any of the corresponding sanctions for

199
200
201

CEH Report, supra note 80, at ¶ 715.
Id. at ¶ 718.
Id. at ¶ 715.
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obstruction of justice.202 Citing a case involving a massacre at Santiago Atitlan, the CEH concluded that during the armed conflict, the
military tribunals were used as forums where selective justice could
be employed.203 Although numerous military officials were involved in the massacre, only one Sergeant and one
Lieutenant were convicted.204 The CEH also cited the Xaman case,
which found that military courts lacked the independence and
impartiality to carry out criminal proceedings.205 The appellate
court that rendered that decision pointed out that military judges
were subject to the military hierarchy and that the Ministry of
Defense paid their salaries.206
In addition, the CEH pointed to the cases during the armed conflict, which were dismissed or overturned under questionable circumstances, as evidence that the judiciary was complicit in human
rights violations during the armed conflict.207 For example, the CEH
highlighted a case that became known as the case of 28. Confronted
with the numerous disappearances that occurred during the armed
conflict, one human rights organization filed 2,000 habeas corpus
petitions, and only 28 were accepted.208 Later, the court concluded
the vast majority of those 28 cases were unfounded.209 The CEH also
described numerous cases in which Guatemala courts dismissed habeas corpus petitions filed by family members in search of their
loved ones as being unfounded and later information (or sometimes
even the individual) surfaced, proving that their loved ones had
been in the custody of the Guatemalan state all along.210 After reviewing these cases, the CEH concluded that the Guatemalan judiciary was “an instrument of defense and protection of the powerful”
and failed to uphold the fundamental rights of those subjected to
grave human rights violations.211
Id. at ¶ 2784.
Id. at ¶ 2785–86.
204
Id.
205
Id. at ¶ 2787.
206
Id. at ¶ 2784.
207
Id. at ¶ 2686.
208
Id. at ¶ 2662.
209
Id.
210
Id. at ¶ 2688–701.
211
Id. at ¶ 2635 (“Todo ello colocó a la población en una situación de absoluta
indefensión frente a los abusos del poder y le ha hecho percibir al Organismo Judicial como un instrumento de defensa y protección de los poderosos, que ha reprimido o negado la protección de los derechos fundamentales, especialmente de
202
203
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However, even more informative than the irregularities of these
cases, was the absolute absence of judicial action in others. The CEH
concluded that the failure of the Guatemalan judiciary to protect human rights during the armed conflict is undeniable “in light of the
thousands of human rights violations registered by the CEH that
were not investigated, judged, or sanctioned by the Guatemalan
State.”212 By exposing the failures of the judiciary, the CEH drew
attention to the need for judicial reform as a centerpiece of transitional justice. As one human rights advocate describe it, “in this
way, the truth pulled justice along with it, it towed it, because it was
clear from the report that what existed was a system of injustice.”213
4.3. “Truth-Full” Justice in Spanish Courts
The CEH report played a critical role throughout the Guatemalan
Generals case in Spain. First, it was the factual foundation of the
complaint that Rigoberta Menchú filed with the Spanish Audiencia
Nacional, being cited and quoted continually throughout the complaint as the primary source of both historical and contemporary
facts regarding the case.214 Even the complaint itself acknowledged
the special significance of the CEH report, characterizing it as “the
most important source for this deliberation” and explaining that
“the most important facts that motivated the presentation of the
complaint originated from the CEH report.”215
quienes han sido víctimas de graves violaciones de derechos humanos.”)
212
Id. at ¶ 2634 (page 127 of El Capítulo Segundo, Las Violaciones de Los
Derechos Humanos y Los Hechos de Violencia, Continúa en El Tomo III). (“El fracaso de la administración de justicia guatemalteca en la protección de los derechos
humanos durante el enfrentamiento armado interno ha quedado clara y plenamente establecido, a la vista de miles de violaciones de derechos humanos registradas por la CEH que no fueron objeto de investigación, juicio ni sanción por el Estado
de Guatemala.”).
213
Interview with Alejandro Rodriquez, supra note 61 (“En ese sentido tal vez
la verdad ha jalado a la justicia… ha remolcado, porque lo que si se percibe
claramente es un sistema de injusticia.”).
214
Spanish Complaint, supra note 191.
215
Id. at 1 (“En el marco general del final del proceso caracterizado por la
firma de los Acuerdos de Paz, sobre los que más adelante haremos las precisiones
necesarias, se determinó la creación de la Comision Para El Esclarecimiento
Historico (CEH), que será la fuente más importante de nuestras ponderaciones.”).
Id. at 13–14 (“Como la parte más importante de los hechos que motivan esta
presentación tienen origen en lo informado por la COMISIÓN PARA EL
ESCLARECIMIENTO HISTÓRICO (CEH) . . . .”).
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4.3.1. TRCs’ Influence on Judicial Decision-making in Spain
The CEH report also had a significant influence on judicial decision-making in the case. Since the complaint was filed under a procedure called a ‘popular action’ (acción popular), which allows for
private citizens to file complaints when a crime affects society as a
whole, it did not require the support of the public prosecutor from
the Spanish Attorney General’s office. In fact, the office actively opposed it.216 When the Spanish Attorney General petitioned to have
the case dismissed in January 2000, one of his reasons was that the
CEH had already investigated the crimes in question.217 On March
27, 2000, the investigating judge, Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco, denied his petition, explaining that the facts alleged in the complaint—
again, largely reliant on the CEH report—were sufficient enough indicators (diligencias) of genocidal acts to warrant further investigation at that stage.218
In the series of appeals that followed that decision, the conclusions of the CEH report were determinative in the courts’ consideration of whether Spain could exercise universal jurisdiction in this
case. On appeal, the en banc panel of the Criminal Section of the
Spanish Audiencia Nacional concluded that pursuant to the subsidiary principle, in order for Spanish courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over a case, the complainant must establish the inaction or
ineffectiveness of the judiciary where the crime occurred—in this
case, Guatemala.219 In justifying its decision to overrule Judge Polanco, the panel reasoned that, even though the findings of the CEH
had no judicial effect (pursuant to its mandate), the CEH had specifically recommended that the State bring cases based on the evidence
216
JUAN DAMIÁN MORENO, LECCIONES INTRODUCTORIAS SOBRE PROCESO PENAL
34 (2013); Guatemalan Generals Case, Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 1,
Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias previas 331/99, Mar. 27, 2000, at 7 (on file with the
author).
217
Id. at 4 (“[S]implemente transmite una preocupación personal por los
hechos ocurridos en la República de Guatemala que, por otra parte, están siendo
investigados por la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico.”) (quoting the public prosecutor’s petition, establishing that the Commission on Historical Clarification is investigating the developments in the Republic of Guatemala) (on file with
the author).
218
Id. at 11.
219
Guatemalan Generals Case, Sala de lo Penal de la Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias previas 331/99, Rollo Apelacion N° 115/2000 (2000).
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documented in its report.220 Furthermore, noting that the CEH report had only been published on February 25, 1999 and the complaint was filed on December 2, 1999, the court concluded that ten
months was not long enough to decide definitively that the Guatemalan judiciary was inactive.221
Later, the Spanish Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that the court should have considered the date that the acts occurred, not when the CEH published its report.222 It also found that
the en banc panel of the Criminal Section of the Spanish Audiencia
Nacional committed an error in evaluating the facts because the CEH
explicitly concluded that the Guatemalan judiciary was ineffective.223 The Spanish Supreme Court thus partially overturned the
Criminal Section’s decision, allowing the prosecutions to move forward for the acts against Spanish citizens only because they implicated the Spanish national interest.224 Later, the Constitutional
Court, the highest court in Spain with the authority to decide constitutional matters, overturned the Supreme Court, concluding that
it improperly added the requirement of having “a connection with
national interests,” which was not present in the universal jurisdiction statute.225 The Constitutional Court thus upheld Judge Polanco’s decision that the complainant presented enough evidence to
move forward with the investigation.226
In 2006, the case was reassigned to Investigating Judge Santiago
Pedraz after Judge Polanco was transferred to another jurisdiction.227 In Judge Pedraz’s own words, the work of CEH, as well as
of REMHI, was “fundamental to this case.”228 He told me that the
CEH was especially useful because it was the most detailed account
of what happened in Guatemala and had the credibility of the UN
behind it.229 Tomuschat also testified before Judge Pedraz and explained why the CEH found that acts of genocide occurred in
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
222
Guatemalan Generals Case, Sala de lo Penal del Tribunal Supremo,
Recurso de Casacion Nº 803/2001, Sentencia Nº 327/2003 (2003) at 19.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Guatemalan Generals Case, Tribunal Constitucional (Sala Segunda) Sentencia Nº237/2005 (2005).
226
Id.
227
Interview with Judge Polanco (Oct. 27, 2016).
228
Interview with Judge Santiago Pedraz (Oct. 27, 2016).
229
Id.
220
221
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Guatemala and what their methodology was.230
The importance of the TRC reports to Judge Pedraz is also clear
from the record. For example, when he issued the international order for the arrest of Ríos Montt, Ángel Aníbal Guevara, Germán
Chupina, Humberto Mejía Victores, Pedro García Arredondo, Donaldo Álvarez, and Benedicto Lucas García in July 2006, he based his
factual findings almost entirely on the CEH and REMHI reports.231
Specifically, in that order, he referred to the CEH report as proof that
the defendants in question were in charge of and had effective control over the military and paramilitary forces who perpetrated the
massacres, enforced disappearances, rapes, displacements and
bombings that were the subject of the complaint.232 He also referred
to the CEH’s description of military commissioners and PACs and
to the statistical findings of the CEH regarding the numbers of grave
violations of human rights.233
Acting upon Judge Pedraz’s order, a Guatemalan court issued
arrest warrants for four of the six defendants in the case.234 However, after a year of detention (of those who did not flee the country),
on December 12, 2007, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court
blocked the extradition of those defendants. According to Judge
Pedraz, because the Guatemalan Constitutional Court blocked him
from conducting his own investigation in Guatemala, the CEH report was essential to the continuation of the case.235
In addition to interviewing both investigating judges assigned
to the Guatemalan Generals case and consulting the record, I also interviewed a number of attorneys who worked as private prosecutors
(as opposed to the public prosecutor from the Spanish Attorney
General’s office) in this case.236 Since all of the attorneys I interviewed had worked on other universal jurisdiction cases as well,
230
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109; Interview with Naomi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 91.
231
Guatemalan Generals Case, Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 1,
Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias previas 331/99 (2006).
232
Id. at 10–16.
233
Id. at 13–15, 22, 25–26.
234
Guatemalan Generals Case, Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala,
Expediente 3380-2007, Sentencia (2007). See also Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do
Justice, supra note 190, at 79–80 (providing an account of the outcomes of Judge
Pedraz’ arrest warrants).
235
Interview with Judge Pedraz, supra note 228.
236
The private prosecutor identifies the accused, presents evidence, and recommends both civil and criminal sanctions. Interview with Joan Garcés (Dec. 4,
2015) (Interview notes on file with author).
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they often spoke in general terms about how the work of truth commissions had been an asset to them. For instance, Enrique Santiago
Romero, who has worked on numerous universal jurisdiction cases
in which the reports of truth commissions were used to support the
claims of his clients, said that the authenticity of the facts in the truth
commission reports is usually assumed.237 He did not know of a
single case in which the judge or the accused challenged the facts
alleged in the reports of truth commission.238 Joan Garcés, the only
surviving personal advisor of Chilean President Salvador Allende
and lead counsel in the Pinochet universal jurisdiction case, explained to me that this is because TRCs usually are sanctioned by
the state.239
Carlos Slepoy, an Argentinian attorney who was the victim of
kidnapping and torture under Argentinian President Isabel Martínez de Perón and has served as a private prosecutor in numerous
universal jurisdiction cases, said that UN-backed truth commissions
in particular are given more weight because they are considered to
be neutral.240 He also found that courts gave more weight to TRCs
when they are composed of panels of experts rather than politicians.241 Carlos Slepoy pointed out that Guatemala was a great example of this, since the legal team used the factual findings from the
CEH report as the foundation of their case.242 In particular, he believes that the CEH’s finding that there were acts that could be classified as genocide was particularly significant for the Spanish
courts.243 According to Slepoy, the report had automatic credibility
237
Interview with Enrique Santiago Romero (Dec. 4, 2015). Specifically,
Romero worked on universal jurisdiction cases involving Argentina, Colombia,
Palestine, and the Western Sahara.
238
Id.
239
Interview with Joan Garcés, supra note 236. He was the lead private prosecutor in the Pinochet case, heading a multinational team of ten lawyers representing nearly 4,000 survivors and families of survivors in approximately 3,000 cases of
assassination, forced disappearance, and torture committed under General Augusto Pinochet’s leadership. He is also one of the only survivors of the bombing of
the Presidential Palace by Pinochet. Before he escaped, he made a promise to President Salvador Allende, who perished in the bombing, that he would tell the world
what had happened there. For more information, see 40 Years After Chilean Coup,
Allende Aide Juan Garcés on How He Brought Pinochet to Justice, DEMOCRACY NOW!
(Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.democracynow.org/2013/9/10/40_years_after_chilean_coup_allende [https://perma.cc/9E7N-AGAD].
240
Interview with Carlos Slepoy (Dec. 4, 2015).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

792

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3

with the court, which never questioned its authority due to the implied legitimacy of its source.244 However, in other cases he has
worked on, the Spanish court did not give the same weight to reports by national truth commissions.245
4.3.2. TRCs as the Principal Investigators in UJ Cases
Similar to its use by Guatemalan attorneys described later in this
article, Enrique Santiago Romero described to me how truth commissions were helpful when they were trying to identify witnesses
and perpetrators, particularly when civil society from the country
where the crimes occurred is less organized.246 Carlos Slepoy further elaborated, stating that in the Guatemalan Generals case the legal
team and the investigating judge used the lists of victims in both
TRC reports to determine who they might contact to identify potential witnesses and perpetrators.247
Manuel Miguel Vergara Céspedes, the Legal Director for the International Foundation of Baltasar Garzón (FIBGAR), who did not
work on the Guatemalan Generals case, but is an expert on universal
jurisdiction in general, explained that the evidence gathered by truth
commissions is especially important in the context of universal jurisdiction.248 This is because the majority of universal jurisdiction
cases have occurred in civil law countries, where an independent
investigating judge leads the investigation.249 Since in universal jurisdiction cases, investigating judges rarely are able to investigate in
the countries where the alleged crimes occurred—as was the case
with Judge Pedraz in the Guatemalan Generals case—judges are heavily reliant on the fact-finding of others, especially TRCs.250 At the
Id.
Id.
246
Interview with Enrique Santiago Romero, supra note 237.
247
Interview with Carlos Slepoy, supra note 240. See also Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice, supra note 190, at 90 (describing how the legal team used the
findings of the CEH report to put together witness lists involving people from the
hardest-hit areas and people who could testify about different aspects of genocide:
massacres, bombings, forced displacement, destruction of community structures,
and targeting of local religious and secular authorities).
248
Interview with Miguel Vergara Céspedes, Legal Director, International
Foundation of Baltasar Garzón (FIBGAR) (Dec. 3, 2015).
249
Id.
250
Id.
244
245
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same time, Pedro Martínez Torrijos, the current prosecutor in charge
of prosecuting universal jurisdiction cases on behalf of the Spanish
Attorney General, cautioned that TRC reports usually can only be
used as indirect evidence (as distinguished from direct evidence, or
“prueba plena,” which directly proves the commission of crime),
since there is no opportunity to confront the witnesses.251
While the CEH report was critical to the Spanish case, that case
also helped to raise the profile of the CEH report. The Spanish case
represented the first time that the report was submitted as evidence
in a criminal case.252 This helped to diffuse the report to a broader
audience, both internationally and nationally.253 While there were a
number of cases with convictions after the release of the CEH report,
only after the Spanish case did Guatemalan attorneys start regularly
admitting the CEH report as evidence in their cases.254 This interplay between the CEH, the Spanish courts, and Guatemalan courts
provides a compelling example of the multidirectional and porous
nature of post-conflict pluralism.
4.4. “Truth-Full” Justice in Guatemalan Courts
After the Spanish case, the admission of the CEH and REMHI
reports at the criminal trials in Guatemala became increasingly common, especially as attorneys set their sights on prosecuting the socalled “intellectual authors of the crimes.” These intellectual authors were the ones who planned and ordered criminal acts but relied on their subordinates to carry them out. In total, I documented
thirty cases involving crimes committed during the armed conflict
that resulted in convictions (including two before military tribunals).255 In fourteen of the nineteen cases that concluded after the
Interview with Pedro Martínez Torrijos (Dec. 3, 2015).
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“[D]igamos a nivel
político es la primera vez que se utiliza el informe, que se cita, con un impacto
internacional, eso también sirvió para la difusión del informe.”).
253
Id.
254
I confirmed this by consulting the sentences in cases that were decided
after the CEH report was released but before the Spanish case was filed.
255
For the purposes of this analysis, I have included Rio Negro I, Part A,
Tribunal de Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de
Salamá, 01-98, Of. 2°, Sentence (1998) [hereinafter Rio Negro I, Part A] and Ríos
Montt, C-01076-2011-00015 Of. 2°, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, Sentence (2013) [hereinafter Ríos Montt]. Even though appellate courts overturned both of these cases,
251
252
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CEH report was publicly released in 1999, the court either admitted
the CEH report as evidence or referenced its findings. The admission of the REMHI report was less common but still significant. In
seven of the twenty-one cases that concluded after REMHI issued its
report in 1998, the court admitted either the REMHI report itself or
evidence that REMHI collected. Echoing the sentiment expressed
by Spanish human rights attorneys, Guatemalan human rights attorneys explained that they believed that the courts gave the CEH
report more weight because it was an official report, ostensibly sanctioned by the Guatemalan government.256
Despite the admonition that the CEH report should not have any
judicial effect, judges have regularly admitted it (and the REMHI report) into evidence as “documentary evidence” (prueba documental).
Under Guatemalan law, the judge can admit and consider documentary evidence, but it cannot be the only source of evidence in a
case.257 However, it can be taken into account as part of the cumulative evidence in a case.258 As a matter of course, Guatemalan trial
courts explain the probative weight (valor probatorio) given to each
piece of admitted evidence in a case. This provides an exact understanding of how much weight the courts gave to the TRC reports
that were admitted as evidence and insight into how these reports
informed the courts’ decisions. Consequently, a review of these sentences reveals that the reports were helpful in identifying those responsible at the structural or systemic level, analyzing the causes
and consequences of the armed conflict and providing the social and
historical context in which the grave crimes occurred. The reports
also had an important role in the prosecution of gender-based violence during the armed conflict as they demonstrated that rape was
systematically employed to demoralize and splinter the Mayan
communities, who were viewed as actual or future supporters of the
guerilla forces.

they are instructive when demonstrating how trial courts weight the CEH and
REMHI reports.
256
Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154.
257
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Básicamente es una
prueba documental que el juez la puede valorar, no puede por sí misma probar
nada, pero en conjunto con los demás elementos de prueba ya tiene un valor.”).
258
Id.
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4.4.1. Truth Commissions as Historians
One of the courts’ most striking uses of the TRC reports in Guatemala was as a source for the historical context of the crimes in
question. These historical facts fall within the broader category of
legislative facts, which inform the underlying narrative through
which a court understands a case. Legislative facts are distinct from
record facts. They are not specific to a case, but rather “include more
generic facts about the world that inform judges’ legal decisions.”259
Through a close examination of these decisions, we see how
courts looked to historical and social context, not solely as the backdrop of a crime, but also to determine motive. Indeed, it was only
with a deep understanding of the historical context that the courts
were able to attribute criminal responsibility to the intellectual authors, who orchestrated the crimes from behind the scenes but did
not directly carry them out. Prior to the release of the CEH report,
there were only convictions of low-level officials for ordinary
crimes.260
A comparison between the sentences that courts rendered before
the release of the TRC reports and those rendered after their release
illuminates how influential they were to judicial decision-making.
In particular, an analysis of the two trials involving the murder of
Myrna Mack Chang, one taking place before the release of the CEH
report and the other after, demonstrates the profound impact the report had on the court’s understanding of the motive for the crime.
Myrna Mack was an anthropologist who worked for the Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences in Guatemala
(AVANCSO) and was investigating the displacement and repatriation of communities during the armed conflict.261 After several days
of surveillance, members of the Security Section of the Presidential
259
Pammela Quinn, Advancing the Conversation: Non-Judicial Voices and the
Transnational Judicial Dialogue, supra note 14, at 56.
260
The convictions that occurred before 2000 were all against lower level officials for ordinary crimes, such as assassination, homicide, and grave injury. See,
e.g., Myrna Mack Chang I, Pieza 20: 3630–50, Sentencia de la Sala Cuarta de la Corte
de Apelaciones, April 28, 1993 [hereinafter Myrna Mack Chang I]; Rio Negro I, Part
A, supra note 255; Rio Negro I, Part B, 01-98, Of. 1°, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Salamá (1999) [hereinafter Rio Negro I, Part B]; Noriega Estrada, Expediente No. 22-96, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal,
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente del departamento de El Quiché (1999)
[hereinafter Noriega Estrada].
261
Myrna Mack Chang I, supra note 260, at 7.
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General Staff (EMP), the Guatemalan equivalent of the U.S. Secret
Service, stabbed her twenty-seven times outside of her office in Guatemala City, resulting in her death.262
In 1993, in large part due to the unrelenting advocacy of her sister Helen Mack, Myrna Mack I became the first case in Guatemala in
which there was a conviction for crimes related to the armed conflict. 263 In that case, the court convicted Noel de Jesús Beteta Alvarez, who was directly involved in her murder, basing its decision
primarily on eyewitness testimony, forensic reports, and photographs. However, the court characterized the crime as if it was an
ordinary crime unrelated to the armed conflict. In its decision, the
court made no mention of the armed conflict and only noted that the
defendant was a Sergeant Major Specialist of the EMP as part of its
more general description of the defendant.264 In addition, even
though the Human Rights Ombudsman who brought the case characterized her murder as extrajudicial killing in the complaint, the
court found Beteta Alvarez guilty of assassination, seemingly viewing her murder as unassociated with the Guatemalan government.265 The court only mentioned the nature of her work once,
when admitting testimony about her research, but specified that this
testimony “only establishe[d] the work that she did” and failed to
link her work to the motive for the crime.266
The trial court also closed the investigations into the EMP chiefs
who allegedly ordered her murder because, according to the court,
there was no proof that they gave the order to kill Myrna Mack
Chang.267 Later, the Guatemalan Supreme Court reversed the trial
court’s decision on this question only, concluding that the trial court
had been derelict in its duty to establish the facts of the case by examining the intersection between “historical truth” and “legal
262
David Baluarte & Erin Chlopak, The Case of Myrna Mack Chang: Overcoming
Institutional Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 11 (2003), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1417&context=hrbrief.
263
Id. See also LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 231 (2012).
264
Myrna Mack Chang I, supra note 260, at 31.
265
Id. at 33.
266
Id. at 31 (“Lo declarado por Clara Josefina María Arenas Bianchi, Carmen
Rosa de León Escribano, Marco Tulio Gutiérrez Arenales, refieren las
investigaciones realizadas por Myrna Elizabeth Mack Chang, sobre refugiados, ex
patriados y desplazados, su preocupación por los indígenas que habitaban áreas de
conflicto, principalmente Quiché y Cobán, y la proyección que tenían sus
investigaciones, solo prueba el trabajo por ella realizado.”).
267
Id. at 33.
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truth,” which courts should deduce, in accordance with the law,
from what appears in the record.268 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the trial court should have taken the claims by the Ombudsman
seriously because the EMP had undeniably participated in numerous extrajudicial killing of Guatemalan citizens, particularly those
who were involved in certain activities such as researching the displacement of indigenous communities, as Myrna Mack did.269
Thus, on remand, in Myrna Mack Chang II, the trial court drew
much of its understanding about the motive for her death from the
historical and social context described in the REMHI and CEH reports, which by then had both been released. Specifically, the court
admitted the second volume of the CEH report, because it provided
a contemporary history of Guatemala and the occurrences of the
armed conflict.270 Upon learning about the National Security Doctrine described in the CEH report, the court concluded that the government erroneously classified Myrna Mack Chang as an “internal
enemy,” linking her to the displaced people she researched in the
interior of the country.271
268
Myrna Mack Chang I, Pieza 20: 3658–88, Corte Suprema de Justicia (1994)
(“Comprobará y establecerá los hechos buscando la coincidencia entre la verdad
histórica y la formal o jurídica y resolverá, conforme las constancias procesales. En
todo caso, prevalecerá la verdad formal deducida, conforme a la ley, de lo que
aparezca en autos. Existe violación de esta norma procesal cuando la Sala no asume
la obligación de promover la investigación sobre la participación de Edgar Augusto
Godoy Gaitan, Juan Valencia Osorio, Juan Guilermo Oliva Carrera, Juan Jose Lario,
Juan Jose Del Cid Morales y un Individuo de Apellido Charchal.”).
269
Id. at 22 (“Que la valoración de estos medios de prueba es esencial cuando
el Procurador de los Derechos Humanos declaró formalmente que se trataba de un
asesinato de naturaleza política que involucraba a las fuerzas de seguridad del
Estado de Guatemala. Expuso, que en nuestro medio, es innegable que las fuerzas
de seguridad han participado abiertamente en la ejecución extrajudicial de
ciudadanos guatemaltecos, en los que ha estado incluido el Estado Mayor
Presidencial. También forma parte de la experiencia social que cierto tipo de
actividades comportan el riesgo de convertir a los ciudadanos en víctimas de la
represión del Estado; que asuntos relacionados con refugiados, desplazados y
repatriados forman parte de estas actividades.”).
270
Myrna Mack Chang II, Tribunal Tercero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad
y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, C-5-99 Of. 3ro., Sentence, Oct. 3, 2002,
24. [hereinafter Myrna Mack Chang II] (“Informe de la Comisión para el
Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) Guatemala, Memorias del Silencio, Tomo II: Las
Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos y Hechos de Violencia, Primera Edición, en
las páginas y números de textos asentadas en el acta correspondiente nos sirven
para conocer la historia contemporánea y su contenido nos permite conocer que fue
lo que ocurrió durante el conflicto armando . . . .”).
271
Id. (“[A]l leer el contenido de la doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional
concluimos que la Antropóloga Myrna Mack se le considero erróneamente enemigo
interno, al vincular su trabajo científico con la situación que vivían los desplazados
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Similarly, the court admitted the third volume of REMHI, entitled “Historical Context,” because it educated the court about the
social, political, and economic evolution of the country from 1986 to
1990 and the relationship between the army and broader society.272
In doing so, it noted the CEH’s and REMHI’s mutual finding that
Myrna Mack Chang’s murder occurred days after the Comunidades
de Población en Resistencia had made a complaint about the activities
of the military.273 Citing the REMHI report, which described her as
the only independent expert on internal displacement in Guatemala,
the court concluded that her death was meant to send a message to
the civilian population.274 Thus, on the basis of both reports and
other evidence presented, the court found that the motive of her
murder was political and convicted the three chiefs of the EMP.275
This was the first time that a Guatemalan court had convicted the
high-level officials, who planned crimes associated with the armed
conflict, but did not directly carry them out.
Similarly, a comparison of the decisions in Rio Negro I and Rio
Negro II demonstrates how the CEH report, which was admitted into
evidence in Rio Negro II, but not Rio Negro I, was critical to the courts’
consideration of the criminal acts under examination by the courts.
The case involved a massacre, during which paramilitary and military forces brutally murdered numerous Mayan women and children from a village called Rio Negro.276 As described in the CEH
report, the Guatemalan military targeted the inhabitants of Rio
en el interior del país, así mismo confirma el móvil político de su asesinato.”).
272
Id. (“Informe de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) Guatemala, Memorias del Silencio, Tomo II: Las Violaciones de los Derechos Humanos
y Hechos de Violencia, Primera Edición, en las páginas y números de textos asentadas en el acta correspondiente, nos sirven para conocer la historia contemporánea
y su contenido nos permite conocer que fue lo que ocurrió durante el conflicto armando . . . .”). See also id. (“Los párrafos citados narran el desenvolvimiento social,
político y económico de Guatemala de mil novecientos ochenta y seis a mil novecientos noventa, describiendo el actuar del ejército en relación a la sociedad.”).
273
Id. (“Al igual que en el informe rendido por la Comisión de
Esclarecimiento Histórico, se da a conocer la difícil situación que vivían los
desplazados y la denuncia efectuada por las Comunidades de Población en
Resistencia, el siete de septiembre de mil novecientos noventa, días antes del
asesinato de Myrna Mack . . . .”).
274
Id. (“[E]n el informe se cita a la antropóloga como la única experta
independiente en el tema de los desplazados y como su muerte constituyó un
mensaje a la población civil, calificando su asesinato de orden político.”).
275
Id.
276
Kathleen Dill, International Human Rights and Local Justice in Guatemala: The
Rio Negro (Pak'oxom) and Agua Fria Trials, 17 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 323, 325 (2005).
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Negro, in part, because they rejected a plan to relocate them from
their ancestral lands near the Chixoy River where the Guatemalan
government planned to build a hydroelectric dam, a project funded
by the World Bank.277
Neither of the two sentences in Rio Negro I made any mention of
this background, which is essential to understanding the motive for
the crime and its connection to the military’s broader campaign. In
the first sentence in Rio Negro I, the trial court convicted three paramilitary officers who played a significant role in the Rio Negro massacre, but concluded that the officers took the law, as they interpreted it, into their own hands and acted without authorization
from the military.278 After the Court of Appeals in Coban overturned this decision on other grounds, the trial court, on remand,
denied any connection at all between the military and the three officers, describing the defendants as farmers who arrived with a
group of other men to Rio Negro.279 The court also refused to admit
the executive order that specified the purpose and authority of the
PACs into evidence, saying that it was not enough to prove that the
accused were members.280
In direct contrast to Rio Negro I, the trial court in Rio Negro II concluded that “in order to analyze the existence of a crime, its judicial
classification, and the criminal responsibility of the accused, it [was]
essential to situate the facts in question within the historical and social-political context in which they occurred.”281 The court thus
heavily relied on the CEH in its decision. Specifically, the CEH report informed the court’s understanding of the causes and consequences of the Rio Negro massacre, situating it within the Guatemalan government’s broader fight against communism.282 As the court
explained, quoting the CEH report, the government had invented a
new adversary called the “internal enemy,” which was broadly
277
CEH, Illustrative Case No. 10: Massacre and Elimination of the Community of
Río Negro, Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio, vol. VI, annex I, 45–47.
278
Rio Negro I, Part A, supra note 255, at 28.
279
Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 1–2, 67.
280
Id. at 64.
281
Rio Negro II, Nº 28-2003, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y
Delitos contra el Ambiente de Salamá, Baja Verapaz, Sentence, May 28, 2008, 315,
325 (“Al analizar la existencia del delito, su calificación jurídica, y la responsabilidad penal de los procesados, es de obligatoria referencia ubicar el contexto histórico
y político-social en el cual se desarrollaron los hechos sometidos a juicio.”) [hereinafter Rio Negro II].
282
Id. at 316.
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defined as “any person, social group, demand, or idea susceptible of
being a launching point, ally, or eventual support to international
communism, either currently or at some point in the future.”283 This
casting of a wide net of adversaries explained why the army targeted communities and individuals that had little to no contact with
guerrilla forces. Again, drawing from the CEH report, the court
noted that the army considered the location of the massacre to be an
area that was strategically important because of its geographic position and socio-economic importance in the region, even though it
never really was a combat zone.284 Fearing that “subversive propaganda” might appeal to the population, the army started by selectively disappearing or killing local leaders, but with time, implemented strategies that indiscriminately targeted anyone who might
have some relation with the guerilla movement.285
Numerous other Guatemalan courts also admitted both the
REMHI and CEH reports for the historical and social context they
provided. For example, in Sepur Zarco, the court also admitted
REMHI and CEH because it provided information about the lived
experience of the climate of violence during the armed conflict and
“contained the recent history of Guatemala, which all Guatemalans
need to know in order to prevent the reoccurrence [of violence].”286
In both the Dos Erres and Ríos Montt cases, the courts, using identical
language, described the CEH report as “a historical document that
provides understanding of the wartime ideology that existed during
the armed conflict, which is the central reference point for the criminal acts that we are judging.”287 In Ríos Montt, in addition to admitting the CEH report, the trial court also admitted the REMHI report
because it served as a compilation of the recent history of

Id.
Id. at 317.
285
Id. at 317.
286
Sepur Zarco, C-01076-2012-00021 Of. 2°, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia
Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala (Tribunal de
Mayor Riesgo “A”), Sentence, Feb. 26, 2016. [hereinafter Sepur Zarco] (“Dicho
informe contiene la Historia reciente de Guatemala, la cual debe ser conocida por
todos los guatemaltecos para evitar su repetición.”).
287
Dos Erres, C-01076-2010-00003, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal
Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, Sentence, Aug. 2, 2011,
236 [hereinafter Dos Erres] (“Es un documento histórico que permite conocer la
guerra ideológica existente durante el conflicto armado, siendo el marco de
referencia en donde se produjo el hecho que se juzga.”). Ríos Montt, supra note 255,
at 663.
283
284
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Guatemala.288
In sharp contrast to the above cases, in Edgar Fernando Garcia I,
the court refused to admit the REMHI report into evidence. This is
the only case I have found in which court failed to admit a TRC report, wholesale, into evidence. Although the court stated that it
thought it was important to know the history of the Guatemalan
armed conflict so that the events do not repeat themselves, that history did not contribute to verifying whether the accused participated in the acts in question.289 However, in that same case, the
court admitted the portion of the CEH report specifically related to
Edgar Fernando Garcia’s disappearance, ironically as a “written,
historical reference” of the extreme events that occurred.290
In direct contradiction to the reasoning in Edgar Fernando Garcia
I, in Edgar Fernando Garcia II, a case involving the intellectual authors
of the disappearance, the court admitted Volume III of REMHI, entitled “Historical Context.”291 Specifically, the court stated that it admitted the REMHI report because it was a historical study of the situation in the 1980s in Guatemala, identified the victims of repression
during those years, and described the violence against social leaders
at the time.292 However, the court rejected Volume VI of REMHI
entitled “Victims of the Conflict,” because it “only contained a list of
places.”293 The court admitted the same part of the CEH report as
the trial court did in Edgar Fernando Garcia I because it established
that the crime was committed in the context of the armed conflict,
when enforced disappearances of student leaders, particularly from
the University of San Carlos, were common.294 This case is significant because it was the first time that senior police officials were convicted “for their role in ordering, overseeing, and then concealing
the crime.”295
Id. at 664.
Edgar Fernando García I, C-01069-1997-00001, Tribunal Octavo de Sentencia
Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente del Departmento de
Guatemala, Sentence, Oct. 28, 2010, 71–72. [hereinafter Edgar Fernando Garcia I].
290
Id. at 68.
291
Edgar Fernando García II, C-01069-1997-00001 Of. 3°, Tribunal Primero de
Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala
(Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo “A”), Sentence, Sept. 20, 2013, 151. [hereinafter Edgar
Fernando Garcia II].
292
Id. at 148. See also REMHI Report, supra note 151, at 90–106, 127–54. (Volume III, Historical Context).
293
Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151–52.
294
Id. at 95–96.
295
Guatemalan Court Convicts National Police Chief, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
288
289
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4.4.2. Truth Commissions as Experts in Organizational
Responsibility
The TRC reports also aided courts to understand the operations
of military units and therefore attribute responsibility up the chain
of command. Hilda Pineda explained that the TRCs illustrated how
various members of the military apparatus, such as the military
commissioners, the intelligence agents, and the police, might have
participated in the armed conflict.296 For example, in Rio Negro II,
the CEH report informed the court’s understanding of the PACs.297
As the CEH report explains, and the court recites, the army mandated the creation of this paramilitary group around 1981.298 CEH
attributed numerous human rights violations during the war to various PACs across the country, which were sometimes committed of
their own accord and sometimes in collusion with government
forces.299 The admission of this evidence is noteworthy because, as
stated above, the second trial court in Rio Negro I rejected the admission of the law that created the PACs, asserting that at no time was
it proven that the accused had been enlisted as PACs.300
Similarly, in Jute, the court admitted the portion of the CEH report that described “the mechanisms of terror” used by the Guatemalan government to disappear people considered to be enemies of
the state.301 In particular, the court found the CEH’s elucidation of
the inter-workings of the PACs as well as the military commissioners, another group created by the military to involve local populations in its counterinsurgency strategies, particularly useful.302 With
ARCHIVE (Sept. 24, 2013), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB440/
[https://perma.cc/ZEK9-RM6G].
296
Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198. (“Hay algunos estudios
específicos dentro las comisiones de la verdad o los informes de la comisión que se
relación a las estructuras que pudieron haber participado, por ejemplo, cómo
funcionaba la defensa civil, los comisionados militares, la inteligencia del ejército,
de la policía, los operativos combinados.”)
297
Rio Negro II, supra note 281, at 318.
298
Id. at 318.
299
Id.
300
Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 64.
301
Jute, 195-2008. Of. 2, El Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal,
Narcoactividad y el Tribunal de Delitos Contra el Ambiente del Departamento de
Chiquimula, Sentence, Dec. 3, 2009, at 124–27.
302
Id. at 124.
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regard to military commissioners, the court admitted the portion of
the CEH report that detailed their organization, structure, chain of
command, and duties.303 As the CEH explained, military commissioners actively participated in denouncing members of their communities to the military, which ultimately resulted in detention, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.304 Sometimes, they would
denounce people who had nothing to do with the guerilla, out of a
desire to keep peace or fear of reprisal from the military.305 The military commissioners were also involved in the capture and transfer
of people believed to be part of or helping the guerillas.306 For example, sometimes they would use their homes as detention centers,
torture people, or assist in enforced disappearances.307 When admitting the report, the court praised the methodology of the CEH report, saying that its credibility was unquestionable.308
In the case regarding the disappearance of Edgar Leonel Paredes
Chegüén, the court also admitted the sections of the CEH report explaining the involvement of military commissioners in enforced disappearances.309 The court highlighted the following specific information from the CEH report that it found helpful: 1) in the western
part of Guatemala, where the disappearance in this case occurred,
the military commissioners were linked to death squads; 2) one in
every three human rights violations was committed by a paramilitary force; 3) military commissioners and the military were responsible for systematic human rights violations and crimes against the
humanity perpetrated during the armed conflict against the civil
population; and 4) the majority of the violations they committed
were extrajudicial killings, torture, deprivation of liberty, enforced
disappearances, and rape.310 In Edgar Fernando Garcia II, the court
admitted Volume II, because it explained how the National Police
Id. at 127.
Id. at 126.
305
Id. at 126.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 126–27.
308
Id.
309
Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, C-20003-2009-000223, Tribunal Primero de
Sentencia Penal Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala (Mayor
Reisgo “B”), Sentence, March 26, 2013, 46. [hereinafter Edgar Leonel Paredes
Chegüén]. See CEH Report, supra note 80, at 158–81 (Chapter 2, Violation of Human
Rights and Acts of Violence, Title V, Military Commissioners). See also id. at 404–58
(Chapter 2, Violation of Human Rights and Acts of Violence, Title XI, Enforced Disappearance).
310
Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, supra note 309, at 46.
303
304
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functioned in the 1980s.311 This evidence was significant in that case,
because the people accused of the disappearance were two heads of
the National Police.312
Alejandro Rodriquez, a human rights attorney for Impunity
Watch, who was the quellrante adhesivo in the Molina Theissen case,
explained that in that case he used the conclusions of the CEH to
demonstrate the pattern and practice of the military. Specifically, he
used it to show that there was a secret military unit that would take
people to military zones and kill them there. He explained that this
was important in his case, because it showed that the enforced disappearance of Marco Antonio Molina Theissen was not an isolated
example.313 This, coupled with the CEH’s finding that there were
around 45,000 disappearances during the armed conflict, helped to
establish the chain of command.314 Since his case was against officials who held high-level positions in the military during the armed
conflict, including Benedicto Lucas García, the former chief of staff
of the military, this evidence was critical.
4.4.3. Truth Commissions as Modus Operandi Experts
Importantly, the TRC reports also offered Guatemalan courts insights on the modus operandi employed by the military and police
during the armed conflict. In some instances, the courts were able
to make links between the specific facts of the case in question and
the general modus operandi of the Guatemalan government documented in the TRC reports. For example, in Edgar Fernando Garcia I,
the court concluded that the enforced disappearances of the leaders
of the student labor organization AEU, including Fernando Garcia,
were part of a general practice of enforced disappearances and
Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151.
Id.
313
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Nosotros usamos el
informe de la CEH en el caso Molina Theissen de diferentes maneras. Primero a
través de sus conclusiones para demostrar la política, los patrones sistemáticas del
ejército, por ejemplo que había un circuito clandestino de atención, que metían a las
personas en zonas militares, que mataban personas dentro de las bases militares.
Todo ello es importante como contexto y no solo para demostrar que era un caso
aislado sino que se trataba de una cadena de mando.”).
314
Id.
(“Además de que la CEH documentó más o menos 6,000
desapariciones forzadas, y hay 45,000 casos de desapariciones forzadas. También
ahí se muestra la cadena de mando.”).
311
312
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extrajudicial killing by the Guatemalan government during the
armed conflict, which the CEH and REHMI reports extensively documented.315
In Dos Erres, the court admitted the section of the CEH report
entitled “Human rights violations and acts of violence,” because it
established that the strategy applied by the army in Dos Erres was
the same as that described in the military’s Victoria 82 Plan. This
Plan directed military units to “conduct security, development,
counter-subversive operations, and ideological warfare in their respective areas on a certain day at a certain time until the new orders
were received, with the goal of locating, capturing, or destroying
subversive elements or groups.”316 Citing the CEH report, the court
explained that the military used violence and propagated terror in
service of these operations to ensure that these communities would
not support the insurgency.317 Whenever the army detected the
presence of the guerilla in an area, it would go to that location or a
nearby community and commit acts of violence against the local
population.318
In Ríos Montt, the court admitted the REMHI report because it
described the various attacks by the military against the Ixil people,
a civilian non-combatant population, and the militarization of daily
life of the people in the Ixil region.319 In Rio Negro II, the court narrated how, according to the CEH report, the military and paramilitary forces tied up the women of the community and treated them
like animals in order to make the brutal repression of the Mayan
population easier.320 In Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, the court noted
that the CEH report proved the modus operandi of military intelligence operations during the armed conflict.321

Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 62.
Dos Erres, supra note 287, at 235 (“Los comandos involucrados conducirán
operaciones de seguridad, desarrollo, contrasubversivos y de guerra ideológica en
sus respectivas áreas de responsabilidad a partir del día ‘D’ hora ‘H’ hasta nueva
orden, con el objeto de localizar, capturar o destruir grupos o elementos
subversivos, para garantizar la paz y seguridad de la Nación . . . .”).
317
Id. at 236.
318
Id. at 235.
319
Ríos Montt, supra note 255, at 664.
320
Río Negro II, supra note 281, at 336.
321
Edgar Leonel Paredes Chegüén, supra note 309, at 46.
315
316
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4.4.4. Truth Commissions as Corroborators
Often times, the reports were admitted because they corroborated other evidence. For instance, in Edgar Fernando Garcia II, the
court admitted Volume III, because it confirmed the reports of four
expert witnesses.322 In Myrna Mack Chang II, the court admitted the
third volume of REMHI because it corroborated “essential aspects”
of information contained in the CEH report.323 In the Spanish Embassy case, the court admitted Case Study 79 from the CEH report,
because of its congruence with other admitted evidence regarding
the bombing of the embassy and the subsequent assassination of the
Rector of the University of San Carlos and several students.324
In Jute, the court noted that the explanation of the operations of
the military commissioners in the CEH report, described in a previous section, corroborated other testimony presented at trial.325 Specifically, the court noted that the CEH corroborated the declaration
of an expert witness who outlined the structure, chain of command,
and operations of military commissioners, particularly during the
period when the acts in question occurred.326 It also corroborated
the testimony of two witnesses who described how the military patrols in the town of Jute operated as well as the process that the accused, who witnesses identified as military commissioners, used to
locate, conduct surveillance of, and capture victims.327 The court
noted that the modus operandi described by these two witnesses
322
Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151 (“Es de utilidad para
confirmer los peritajes rendidos por los peritos Katharine Temple Lapsley Doyle,
Rember Aroldo Larios Tobar, Valia Elisa Muralles Bautista, Marina Consuelo
García Bravatti de Villagran.”).
323
Myrna Mack Chang II, supra note 270, at 24 (El Informe Proyecto
Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica “Guatemala, Nunca
Más”. Tomo III, “El Entorno Histórico”, en las páginas y número de texto asentadas
en el acta correspondiente, nos sirven para establecer los siguientes aspectos: A)
Este informe corrobora en aspectos esenciales, el contenido del Informe formulado
por la comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico, al hacer referencia a las violaciones
de Derechos Humanos registrados durante el conflicto armado.”).
324
Interestingly, the investigation and determination of responsibility for the
bombing of the Spanish Embassy was included as part of the mandate of the CEH.
Spanish Embassy, C-01071-1980-00547, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal,
Narcoactividad, y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, Sentence, January 19,
2015, 286–88, 312.
325
Jute, supra note 301, at 128.
326
Id.
327
Id. at 128–29.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/4

2018]

Post-Conflict Pluralism

807

was the same as that described in the CEH report.328
The court in Dos Erres also admitted the case study on the Dos
Erres massacre from the CEH report because it corroborated the expert report rendered by Social Historian Manolo Estuardo Vela
Castañeda.329 Both reports found that the army mistakenly believed
that the Dos Erres community was linked to the guerilla group
called Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) and that the massacre was in
retribution for an ambush carried out by the FAR.330 The reports by
CEH and the expert witness also both found that the kaibiles, a military unit that specialized in these types of operations, were responsible for the massacre, and that the high command of the military
planned it.331 Chillingly, both reports also found that the Dos Erres
massacre was the only one in the history of the Peten, a northern
region of Guatemala, where a community was wiped entirely off the
map.332
Additionally, in Ríos Montt, the court admitted Volumes I, II, II,
X, and XI of the CEH report, in part because it established that the
strategy utilized by the military during the armed conflict in the
1980s was the same as that delineated in the military’s plan called
Victoria 82, which was also admitted into evidence.333 It also admitted Volumes I, II, II, and IV of the REMHI report because it corroborated the following evidence: 1) the testimony and report rendered
by expert witness Nieves Gómez Dupuis; 2) the testimony of the survivors who described the massacres in the Ixil region and how the
military’s goal was to destroy the seed of their population; 3) the
testimony of both expert and lay witnesses who established that the
armed conflict caused the destruction of their social fabric; 4) the testimony of survivors about enforcement disappearances, torture, and
their escape to the mountains; 5) the testimony of Ixil women about
being raped by soldiers; and 6) the existence of the mechanisms of
terror described in various military plans, including Victoria 82,
Firmeza 83, and Operation Sofia.334

328
329
330
331
332
333
334

Id. at 129.
Dos Erres, supra note 287, at 238.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Ríos Montt, supra note 255, at 662–63.
Id. at 664.
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4.4.5. Truth Commissions on Collective Harm
Truth commissions sometimes adopted the all-important role of
conveying cultural information that helped courts understand why
human rights abusers employ certain strategies and what harm they
cause to both communities and individuals. For instance, in Rio Negro II, drawing from the CEH report, the court explained that in addition to the physical harm caused by the repeated brutal rapes of
the women and girls from Rio Negro, they also inflicted a symbolic
injury on the community, because Mayan women bear the responsibility for social and cultural reproduction in those communities.335
Specifically, “the women personify the values that should be reproduced in the community and they were dishonored.”336 This explanation helped the court understand that these acts were not isolated
crimes, but rather part of an orchestrated military strategy. In the
same case, citing Case Study 14 from the CEH report, the court concluded that the children of Rio Negro, who were taken and forced
to be indentured servants for the very people that killed their relatives, experienced immeasurable psycho-social consequences as a
result of their degrading treatment and complete upheaval from
their societal norms and culture.337
Similarly, in Choatalum, a case in which a military commissioner
was convicted of enforced disappearance during the armed conflict,
the court admitted the CEH report because it explained the numerous reasons, such as needing to flee to the mountains and the general
climate of terror, that prevented thousands of Guatemalans from observing the rituals that they normally would perform when they lost
a loved one.338 This caused profound pain in the affected communities, which was particularly acute in the instance of enforced disappearance, because of the uncertainty of not knowing the whereabouts or fate of the disappeared person.339 This was especially
harmful to Mayan communities, who maintain a strong connection

Rio Negro II, supra note 281, at 336.
Id. (“Las mujeres personifican los valores que deben ser reproducidos en
la comunidad y fueron mancilladas . . . .”).
337
Id. at 354.
338
Choatalum, C-26-2,006 Of. III, Tribunal de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad
y Delitos contra el Ambiente del Departamento de Chimaltenango, Sentence, Sept.
7, 2009, 69–70 [hereinafter Choatalum].
339
Id.
335
336
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with the dead.340 The trial court also, significantly, noted that the
CEH found that the clandestine cemeteries and the anxiety of not
knowing what happened to their relatives, even today, continues to
be an open wound in the country and a permanent reminder of the
violent acts that degraded the dignity of their loved ones.341 This
finding became particularly important later in this case, when on
appeal, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court found that enforced
disappearance does not have a statute of limitations because of the
continuing nature of harm it causes.342
Similarly, the court in Edgar Fernando Garcia II admitted Volume
I of REMHI entitled “The Impact of Violence” because it discussed
the context that produced enforced disappearances and explained
the unresolved grief that they caused for the family and friends of
the disappeared.343
4.4.6. Truth Commissions as Investigatory Bodies
Truth commissions also acted as investigatory bodies, which
was critical given that many of Guatemala’s state institutions were
either corrupt or completely ineffectual.344 For example, as the CEH
noted in its report, the Guatemalan judiciary was unable to guarantee compliance with the law and tolerated and, in some instances,
fomented violence.345 In fact, during the armed conflict, the Guatemalan government used the judiciary as a tool to shield its repressive actions from judgment and repress its enemies.346 Additionally,
many of the institutions that would have been responsible for
Id.
Id. at 70.
342
Choatalum, Corte de Constitucionalidad.
343
Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 151.
344
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 23 (“El Sistema judicial del país, por su
ineficacia provocada o deliberada, no garantizó el cumplimiento de la ley,
tolerando y hasta propiciando la violencia. Por omisión o acción, el Poder Judicial
contribuyó al agravamiento de los conflictos sociales en distintos momentos de la
historia de Guatemala. La impunidad caló hasta el punto de apoderarse de la
estructura misma del Estado, y se convirtió tanto en un medio como en un fin.
Como medio, cobijó y protegió las actuaciones represivas del Estado, así como las
de particulares afines a sus propósitos, mientras que, como fin, fue consecuencia de
los métodos aplicados para reprimir y eliminar a los adversarios políticos y
sociales.”)
345
Id.
346
Id.
340
341
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investigating and collecting evidence did not exist at the time of the
crimes. For example, Ley Orgánica del Ministerio Público, which created the Attorney General’s office, only went into effect in 1994.347
Similarly, the Congress enacted the first Code of Criminal Procedure
in 1992.348
For that reason, TRCs sometimes had to guard evidence that
likely would have been destroyed if a state institution had gotten
ahold of it. For example, in Edgar Fernando García I, the court admitted recorded testimony that REMHI had obtained from an anonymous source. The case involved the disappearance of Edgar Fernando García, who the National Police had detained along with
another student, Danilo Chinchilla.349 García and Chinchilla were
two of seven student leaders of a labor organization at the University of San Carlos who the police had detained during a three-month
period.350 During the arrest, the police shot Chinchilla as he tried to
escape and he was taken to Hospital Roosevelt.351 Once there, a
group of leaders from the Guatemalan Labor Party helped him escape.352 At that time, Chinchilla made a tape recording in which he
explained what happened to García and him when they were detained.353 Many years later, when REMHI began its investigation,
the recording was given to the director of ODHAG so that it could
be analyzed as part of REMHI.354 Chinchilla later became one of the
numerous disappeared in Guatemala and thus was unable to testify
at trial, so the prosecutor sought to admit his recorded testimony.355
After hearing testimony from Chinchilla’s partner who verified
without hesitation that the voice on the recording was Chinchilla’s,
347
Ley Orgánica del Ministerio Público, Decreto Numero 40–94,
http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/mla/sp/gtm/sp_gtm-mla-leg-publico.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB5F-G96M]. Public Hearing by Judge Miguel Angel Galvez in
Ríos Montt (Feb. 4, 2013).
348
Decreto Numero 51-92.
349
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 145 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos,
CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares
Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán. Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)).
350
Id.
351
Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 63. CEH Report, supra note 80,
at 146 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos, CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de
Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán.
Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)).
352
Id.
353
Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 63.
354
Id.
355
Id. at 64–65.
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the court admitted it into evidence.356 The court said that the recording made them certain about the detention and subsequent disappearance of Fernando García.357
The court in Edgar Fernando García I also admitted a certificate
that contained testimony collected by REMHI regarding efforts
made to locate Edgar Fernando García after his disappearance, including filing legal complaints and publishing announcements in
Guatemalan newspapers.358 Similarly, in Edgar Fernando García II,
the court admitted a questionnaire from an interview conducted by
REMHI because it contained information about Edgar Fernando
García as well as documents related to his disappearance.359
Later down the line, TRC reports also provided a blueprint for
prosecutors’ investigations of cases. Numerous prosecutors and attorneys from human rights organizations explained that in nearly
all of their cases, they used both the REMHI and CEH reports as a
launching point for their investigations.360 Hilda Pineda said that
“one of the first things prosecutors in her office do when they start
an investigation is check if the case is documented in the REMHI or
CEH reports.”361 She said that “it opens the door for us to enter.”362
Sometimes, prosecutors used the report to identify witnesses and
even perpetrators.363 Given that witnesses were not named in either
report and perpetrators were not named in the CEH report, this is a
surprising revelation. In the case of REMHI, the directors of the project explained that sometimes they would act as liaisons between
witnesses and prosecutors from the Attorney General’s Office.364
For example, if the Attorney General’s office hoped to bring a case
regarding a particular event, they would consult REMHI’s database

Id. at 65.
Id.
358
Id. at 74.
359
Edgar Fernando Garcia II, supra note 291, at 149–50.
360
Interviews with attorneys from GAM, ODHAG, CALDH, and MTM, and
prosecutors Hilda Pineda and Orlando Lopez.
361
Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“Primero porque nos dan las
primeras herramientas para iniciar nuestra investigación. Una de las acciones
preliminares que realiza el fiscal es verificar si en el REMHI o en la Comisión de
Esclarecimiento Histórico está el caso documentado. Porque esto nos ayuda a
buscar información que ahí mismo se relaciona.”).
362
Id. (“Nos abre la puerta para entrar.”)
363
Id.
364
Interview with Edgar Gutiérrez, supra note 152; Interview with a Diocese
Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153.
356
357
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to identify potential witnesses.365 ODHAG would then contact the
witness to see if they would consent to having their contact information shared with the Attorney General’s Office and possibly testify before a tribunal.366 This happened in the case of Fernando García
I. According to Alejandro Rodriguez, who worked in the office of
the Procurador de los Derechos Humanos when it brought the case, his
legal team consulted the REMHI database and identified a person
who ended up being a key witness in their case.367
Both the REMHI and CEH reports also helped investigators locate clandestine graves. Hilda Pineda explained that the reports
helped investigators locate where potential witnesses might be or
specific information about the location of the graves. With this information, her investigators are able to go to that location and ask
people where the remains might be. In some cases, the family buried the victims themselves and could tell them exactly where they
were buried.368 Alejandro Rodriquez also described how the reports
provided a legal basis for people to petition for exhumations because they described the approximate location where their family
member might be buried.369 In the Choatalum case, the trial court
explained that it considered REMHI and CEH “relevant and pertinent in the clarification of the case, especially because they helped
identify the whereabouts of a clandestine grave in a location where
a military base operated at the time of the armed conflict.”370 The
reports also provided a basis for victims to ask for reparations from
the Guatemalan government.371
The reports were also informative for judges. Pulling a copy of
Id.
Id.
367
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61.
368
Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“Algunas informaciones nos
han ayudado, por lo menos, a ubicar testigos dentro del caso o alguna relación en
específico del lugar, porque ya con el lugar nosotros ya nos desplazamos y esto hace
que las personas luego nos digan y nos señalen el lugar donde posiblemente esté
una persona enterrada de manera clandestina, o por necesidad de la familia en los
operativos militares algunos familiares los enterraron ellos mismos.”).
369
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61 (“Para la gente también
es importante, porque también permite solicitar exhumaciones porque se señalan
los lugares o lugares aproximados a donde pertenecía la víctima.”).
370
Choatalum, supra note 338, at 70 (“[C]onclusiones de estos informes que
este tribunal considera relevantes y pertinentes para el esclarecimiento del presente
caso, toda vez que en el caso concreto se probó la existencia de un cementerio clandestino en el lugar donde funcionó un destacamento militar.”).
371
Interview with Alejandro Rodriguez, supra note 61.
365
366
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REMHI from his shelf, Judge Miguel Angel Galvez told me that
REMHI was very valuable to him because it helped him to identify
what military reports and other documents to consult.372 This is particularly significant as Judge Galvez declassified a number of military documents in the Diario Militar case.373 They also are helpful
tools for human rights organizations when training new staff. The
legal director of Grupo Apoyo Mutual (GAM) explained that
REMHI and CEH are mandatory reading for all new hires.374
4.4.7. Truth Commissions as Reporters to the Experts
The TRC Reports also provided helpful background information
for expert witnesses. In Plan de Sanchez, an expert witness on military strategy recounted how the CEH explained the concept of “internal enemy” found in the military’s manual on the war against
subversives.375 Drawing from what he had read in the CEH report,
he interpreted the reference to the internal enemy to mean, practically speaking, that the military must eliminate communists, collaborators, and anyone that, even without being a communist, supports
the ideology and favors using subversive activities to take power.376
When discussing the G2, a Guatemalan military unit, he quoted the
CEH report as the basis for his finding that military intelligence was
based on gossip, which explains why there was so much abuse of
innocent people.377
In Sepur Zarco, Prudencio Garcia Martinez de Murguia, an expert
witness on military operations, used both REMHI and CEH as the
basis of his opinion. He specifically referenced REMHI, stating that
the military’s objective was to paralyze the indigenous population
who might give support to the guerilla by indicating, explicitly or
implicitly, that if you collaborate with the guerilla, what happened
Interview with Miguel Angel Galvez (Nov. 14, 2016).
Evelyn De León, Juez Gálvez desclasifica 8 planes militares del conflicto armado,
SOY 502 (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.soy502.com/articulo/juez-galvezdesclasifica-8-planes-militares-conflicto-armado [https://perma.cc/P6JX-WCQP].
374
Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154 (“Es como una lectura
obligatoria para quienes se integran, para que se enteren de la situación.”)
375
Plan de Sanchez, C-01076-2011-00001 Of. 1, Tribunal Primero de Sentencia
Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos Contra el Ambiente (Mayor Riesgo A), Sentence,
March 14, 2012, 45. [hereinafter Plan de Sanchez]
376
Id. at 45, 77.
377
Id. at 60.
372
373
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to your brother, father, or neighbor will happen to you.378 He also
referred to the great number of cases of rape documented by the
CEH report as evidence that it was a regular practice of the Guatemalan army during the armed conflict.379 He also noted that the
CEH described how the military would always separate the women
from everyone else when they descended on a village.380 The expert
witness concluded that this demonstrated premeditation and noted
that the report made it clear that these incidents were not isolated
outbursts of hate or savagery aimed at those in close proximity.381
The court gave evidentiary weight to both of these findings.382 The
expert also noted that REMHI demonstrated a clear harm to the psychology of the Maya population that resulted from these assaults.383
Similarly, in Plan de Sanchez, an expert witness on social psychology drew from the CEH report when finding that rape was a common practice during the armed conflict and designed to destroy the
dignity of a person in the most intimate way.384 Noting the report,
the expert also described the collective harm to the Mayan communities that experienced communal shame from the memory of the
rape of Mayan women in their communities.385
In Edgar Fernando Garcia I, an expert witness named Fernando
Arturo Lopez Antillon, who was a former director of ODHAG and
provided his expertise on the use of recurso de exhibicion personal
(which is similar to our habeas corpus) during the period when Edgar disappeared, explained that he used both REMHI and CEH as
background information for his testimony.386
5. LESSONS FROM GUATEMALA ABOUT POST-CONFLICT PLURALISM
The example of Guatemalan transitional justice offers broader
lessons for how post-conflict pluralism can have liberalizing effects
and fortify the rule of law. Specifically, at the macro level, the TRCs
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386

Sepur Zarco, supra note 286, at 57.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 60.
Plan de Sanchez, supra note 375, at 87–88.
Id. at 88.
Edgar Fernando Garcia I, supra note 289, at 38.
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in Guatemala: 1) diffused legal norms derived from international
human rights and humanitarian law locally; 2) created space for the
expression of alternative narratives about the armed conflict that
countered the dominant official narrative and ultimately influenced
judicial decision-making; and 3) filled a void when impartial and
independent state institutions did not exist.
5.1. TRCs Diffuse Human Rights Norms
First, the case of Guatemala demonstrates how TRCs can act as
“norm diffusers,” spreading the legal norms and precedent of international human rights law to local jurisdictions.387 Even though, as
specified in its mandate, the CEH was not supposed to have any legal effect, it succeeded in bringing the language and norms of international human rights to Guatemala very visibly and with a veil of
authority. As I explained in Part II, the CEH interpreted the Oslo
Agreement’s reference to human rights as an instruction to use international human rights and humanitarian law when evaluating
what occurred during the armed conflict.388 It, thus, characterized
the crimes it documented using the language of international criminal justice and human rights law instead of ordinary crimes. For
instance, using the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, which Guatemala ratified in 1950, as its
legal basis, the CEH concluded that the military perpetrated acts of
genocide against the Mayan-Ixil population from 1980 to 1983.389
The CEH found that, in that region, between 70% to 90% of the
towns were razed to the ground.390
387
Berman, supra note 15, at 1173 (defining norm entrepreneurs as “individuals or groups who try to influence popular opinion in order to inculcate a social
norm.”)
388
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 45.
389
Id. at 358 (“A juicio de la CEH, el conjunto de acciones violentas
perpetradas por el Estado contra la población maya-ixil durante los años 1980–1983,
permite concluir que se cometieron actos de genocidio, inspirados por una
determinación estratégica que también revistió carácter genocida, por cuanto un
objetivo de la campaña militar contrainsurgente fue la destrucción parcial del grupo
víctima, al considerarse que de esta manera se lograría vencer al enemigo.”). Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the armed conflict began.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
390
See CEH Report, supra note 80, at 358 (“El caso más notable es el de la
región Ixil, donde entre el 70% y el 90% de las aldeas fueron arrasadas.”).
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A comparison between the cases before and after the release of
the TRC reports reveal their persuasive effect, particularly with regard to how courts classified crimes associated with the armed conflict. Prior to their release, Guatemalan courts exclusively characterized even the gravest international crimes as common crimes such
as homicide, assassination, or kidnapping. As one human rights attorney explained, the Guatemalan judicial system was not accustomed to using terms like crimes against humanity, disappearance,
or torture.391 As a result of a deliberate campaign by the military to
discredit human rights defenders, human rights was associated with
communism; it was synonymous with something bad.392 So even
though Guatemala incorporated crimes such as genocide and war
crimes into its criminal code in 1973, Guatemalan courts did not classify the grave crimes committed during the armed conflict as such
until the late 90s.393 This change is particularly telling for convictions rendered after the enactment of Guatemala’s amnesty law in
1996, which extinguished criminal liability for any common or political crimes related to the armed conflict, but not for core international crimes, like genocide, torture, and enforced disappearance.394
For example, in the decision Rio Negro I, rendered in 1998, the Guatemalan court classified the crimes associated with the Rio Negro
massacre as assassination, instead of as genocide or crimes against
humanity. However, after the release of the CEH report, prosecutors start charging crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, and
enforced disappearances.
Most strikingly, the CEH’s conclusion that the military perpetrated acts of genocide against the Mayan-Ixil population was the
impetus for two cases that included charges of genocide.395 Not only
was this finding the basis of the Guatemalan Generals case in Spain,
in which genocide was charged, but also in the Ríos Montt case in
391
Interview with Mynor Alvarado, supra note 154 (“La explicación es que,
nuestro sistema judicial no estaba acostumbrado a estos casos de lesa humanidad,
desaparición, tortura. Eran términos que no se utilizaban.”).
392
Id. (“Los derechos humanos en Guatemala estaban asimilados a la guerrilla. Es decir, el término viene de los comunistas, desde los guerrilleros.”).
393
See Mark Berlin & Geoff Dancy, The Difference Law Makes: Domestic Atrocity
Laws and Human Rights Prosecutions, 51 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 533 (2017) (noting that Guatemalan courts rejected challenges to the prosecution of government officials in the
1990s because the country’s amnesty law specifically excluded crimes against humanity and genocide from amnesty).
394
Guatemalan National Reconciliation Law, Decree 145-96, Dec. 27, 1996.
395
Id. at 358. Guatemala ratified the Genocide Convention in 1950, before the
armed conflict began. Genocide Convention, supra note 389.
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Guatemala, which was the first time that a former head of state was
tried for genocide in their home country. Prior to the release of the
CEH report, what occurred in Guatemala had not been officially
characterized as genocide.396
Given the gap between the enactment of atrocity laws in the
early 70s and their use in criminal cases involving grave crimes committed during the armed conflict, the TRCs, by using human rights
language to characterize the crimes committed during the armed
conflict, facilitated the internalization of human norms, particularly
amongst state actors. The TRCs bolstered human rights advocates’
claims that these crimes rose to the level of grave international
crimes and created political openings for the prosecution of high
level military officials. In the view of one human rights advocate I
interviewed, the most important aspect of the CEH report was its
classification of the facts as crimes, because it provided judges with
cover in their decisions.397
Many scholars have examined how legal norms diffuse across
judicial networks.398 However, less attention has been paid to how
TRCs that characterize abuses using the human rights frame can also
spread human rights norms. This finding also builds on the work
of other scholars in the political science arena, which examine what
factors encourage compliance with human rights law in domestic
contexts, particularly those scholars who have explored why prosecutions of human rights violations occur in some post-conflict societies but not others. For instance, Beth Simmons has theorized that
ratification of human rights treaties promotes local diffusion of human rights norms in transitioning countries by creating a favorable
environment for civil society to demand rights, thereby facilitating
social mobilization.399 She theorizes that treaties catalyze a reorientation of citizens’ values and beliefs by reframing their grievances
396
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 358 (“El caso más notable es el de la región
Ixil, donde entre el 70% y el 90% de las aldeas fueron arrasadas.”).
397
Interview of a Member of the Legal Team at ODHAG Who Wishes to
Remain Anonymous (July 27, 2016) (“Esto ha permitido que los jueces se sientan
más amparados en cuanto a sus conclusiones. Lo vimos en el único caso de juicio
por genocidio en contra de Efraín Ríos Montt.”).
398
See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 148 (2004)
(describing principles underlying the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2638
(1997); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005).
399
See SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 148.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

818

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3

with the state in terms of guaranteed rights.400
In a more recent study, Mark Berlin and Geoff Dancy concluded
that the codification of human rights treaties into domestic criminal
codes increases the likelihood that human rights prosecutions will
occur.401 Yet, these studies do not account for the justice delay between the adoption of human rights treaties and their use in prosecutions experienced in a number of countries, including Guatemala.
The findings of this study point to the need for an external catalyzing factor, such as the intervention of a credible TRC that recasts past
violations using the human rights framework, in order to effectuate
the internalization of human rights norms. This study thus invites
further empirical research into whether this finding—i.e. that TRCs
encourage internalization of human rights norms, as manifested by
its use in litigation—is generalizable or specific to the context of
Guatemala.
The study also adds to the literature on socialization of states by
suggesting that acculturation not only occurs among states, but also
between transitional justice mechanisms and states. This may also
explain Simmons’s finding that ratification of human rights treaties
only had a measurable effect on human rights compliance in transitioning countries, but not stable democratic countries or authoritarian regimes.402
5.2. TRCs Create Space for Narrative Contestation
In addition to diffusing legal norms, TRCs can offer a locale for
narrative contestation, which can also greatly affect judicial decision-making. As prominent legal scholar Robert Cover explained in
his landmark work, Nomos and Narrative, “[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning.”403 In countries transitioning after mass atrocities have occurred, the national narrative, or what sociologist Émile
Durkheim called the collective conscience, which is a nation’s or society’s collective understanding of its own history, must be reconstructed.404 Since individuals likely experience mass atrocity
Id. at 152.
See generally Berlin & Dancy, supra note 393.
402 SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 82–86.
403 Cover, supra note 30, at 4.
404 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79 (George Simpson trans.,
400
401
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differently depending on their socioeconomic and cultural identity,
creating a common understanding of the past to forge a national
identity is extremely challenging.
This was certainly the case in Guatemala, where citizens had
very different experiences of the violence depending on whether
they were urban or rural, poor or wealthy, and Mayan or ladino. For
example, if you were a wealthy ladino living in Guatemala City, you
might have been only vaguely aware of the scorched earth campaign
in the countryside.405 This divide made the work of the TRCs all the
more important. Because the TRCs interviewed thousands of individuals all across Guatemala in an attempt to clarify the past, a task
that courts are not equipped to take on, they were able to construct
a collective narrative that was a composite of all of those individual
voices. The narrative that emerged from this process was quite different from the official state narrative that the military had propagated during the years of the conflict. In Christian Tomuschat’s own
words, before the CEH released its report, “the country felt that the
armed conflict was a big success; that the country had been saved
from Communism and that it had in fact been a terrible tragedy did
not enter their minds.”406 Hilda Pineda, the current head of the war
crimes unit in the Guatemalan Attorney General’s office, explained
that part of the strategy of the Guatemalan government was to ensure that no one knew what was happening. That allowed them to
guard their prestige.407 She said that she has even called journalists
to testify in her cases about how they were censured and prevented
from informing the public about what occurred.408 Once the CEH’s
finding that the military was responsible for over 90% of the crimes

1933) (describing the collective conscience as the “totality of beliefs and sentiments
common to average citizens of the same society”).
405
Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198 (“El ejército, parte de su
política de arrasamiento de tierras y de estrategia militar fue no permitir ninguna
publicidad, no se sabía lo que ocurría, las comunidades estaban sufriendo de una
manera tan cruel y despiadada y sin embargo muchas personas de la ciudad nunca
se enteraron de lo que ocurría.”)
406
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.
407
Interview with Hilda Pineda, supra note 198.
408
Id. (“Por mucho tiempo se ocultaron los hechos, incluso los mismo de
comunicación que han declarados en algunos de los juicios, el caso de Ríos Montt,
el caso de la embajada de España, el caso de Fernando García, han llegado
periodistas a ser testigos de los juicios y ellos mismo dicen ‘teníamos censura,
estábamos censurados, no podíamos decir lo que ocurría, no podíamos informar.’”
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went public, it took away from the military’s prestige and glory.409
According to Christian Tomuschat, discrediting the military, which
still had a tremendous amount of political power in Guatemala, was
one of the most important outcomes of the CEH’s work.410
The narrative shifting work of the TRCs had a very tangible impact in Guatemala. This recasting of the narrative of the armed conflict and resultant delegitimization of the military created an opening for prosecutions of high-level officials that did not exist prior to
the release of the CEH.411 As the former Attorney General of Guatemala Claudia Paz y Paz explained, the CEH report was critical not
only because it defined the crimes of the military, but also because
it created the political will necessary to bring the cases charging
those crimes.412 Similarly, Alejandro Rodriguez believes that the
most important thing that REMHI and CEH did was to engender a
movement for justice.413 In his own words, “Here, without a doubt,
the CEH report shook Guatemala and opened the way to start the
fight for justice.”414
In addition, Alejandro Rodriguez believes that without the CEH
report, civil society would not have been able to advocate as successfully for the need to construct new legal systems.415 In his view,
the CEH report motivated the population. It generated a space to
discuss what had never been discussed before.416 He explained that
before the release of the CEH report, everyone was afraid. It is hard
to describe or understand the fear that existed in 1993 and 1994,
much less the early 80s.
The population was completely
Interview with Christian Tomuschat, supra note 109.
Id.
411
García-Godos & Raúl Salvado, Guatemala: Truth and Memory on Trial, supra
note 92, at 208 (“The first major impulse leading to judicial processes for past human rights abuses was the delivery of the CEH report in 1999. The report offered
a window of opportunity for victims’ groups and human rights organizations to
put forward claims to establish responsibility for past crimes.”)
412
Interview with Claudia Paz y Paz, Former Attorney General of Guatemala
(Feb. 14, 2017).
413
Interview with Alejandro Rodríguez, supra note 61 (“Creo que eso es lo
más importante, el proceso REHMI y comisión genera un moviente en busca de la
justicia.”).
414
Id. (“. . . aquí sin duda el impacto de la CEH sacudió a Guatemala y abrió
el camino para iniciar la lucha por la justicia.”).
415
Id. (“Sin el informe de la CEH no se hubiese podido avanzar en la
necesidad de construcción de nuevos sistemas jurídicos.”).
416
Id. (“Pero probablemente el informe de la CEH conmovió a la población.
Primero generó el espacio para discutir algo que nunca se había discutido, que todo
el mundo tenía miedo de poderlo hacer.”).
409
410
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immobilized.417 The CEH was critical in creating safe spaces where
victims could express themselves, discuss what really happened,
and develop their own history.418
The significance of historical narrative is all the more important
when courts grapple with extraordinary crimes, like genocide and
crimes against humanity. As Neha Jain explains in Radical Dissents,
“unlike the standard case of trials for ordinary crimes, extraordinary
criminality such as mass atrocity requires the construction of a
broader context that provides meaning and content to the conduct
of the individual accused in the courtroom.”419 This is because, by
their very definition, crimes against humanity and genocide require
prosecutors to prove that individual attacks are part of a broader
operation.420
Due to the time and procedural constraints that courts face,
courtrooms are not suitable venues for developing the historical
context needed to understand these crimes. For that reason, the narratives documented by the TRCs in Guatemala supplied more than
just the historical backdrop of the crimes; they significantly influenced how courts determined what crimes had been committed,
why they occurred, and who was culpable for them. As I described
in Part III, prior to the release of the CEH, Guatemalan courts often
portrayed the crimes associated with the armed conflict as the acts
of rogue military or paramilitary officials, or as the court did in Rio
Negro I, as the acts of civilians with no connection to the military.421
The REMHI and CEH reports revealed that these were not the
417
Id. (“La verdad es que no logró como describir o aprehender el fenómeno
del miedo que había en 1993–1994, la que población esta inmovilizada completamente. Y ya ni regresemos al 84, que son ya 30–35 años que llevan estos juicios . . .
.”).
418
Id. (“El sistema de justicia ha cambiado muchísimo y el CEH fue central
en generar espacios de confianza, discusión de la verdad, que las victimas pudieran
tener un espacio para expresarse, y una reivindicación histórica.”).
419
Neha Jain, Radical Dissents in International Criminal Trials, 28 EUR. J. INT’L.
L. 1163 (2017).
420
For example, the Rome Statute—the treaty that created the International
Criminal Court (ICC)—provides that in order for a crime to be classified as a crime
against humanity it must be part of a “widespread or systematic” attack. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187
U.N.T.S. 90. An attack is considered “widespread” either because of the large number of victims in a single incident, or the cumulative effects of a number of incidents.
Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1013 (2005). To be “systematic,” it must have occurred as part of an organized plan to commit violence against a collective. Id.
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Rio Negro I, Part B, supra note 260, at 1–2, 67.
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random acts of a few bad apples, but rather part of a broader orchestrated military plan, thus legitimizing the narrative of Mayan communities whose voices have traditionally be marginalized in Guatemala. In this way, the TRCs had a similar effect to what Beth
Simmons theorizes regarding human rights treaties, namely they
empowered groups with different rights preferences than the country’s political elites.422
5.3. TRCs Fulfill the Duties of Corrupt or Ineffective State Institutions
Finally, because TRCs are typically state-sanctioned entities, but
operate independently from the government, they can fill a void
when state institutions are corrupt or inoperable. As was the case in
Guatemala, after mass atrocities occur, state entities may be defunct
or act in the service of human rights abusers. Under these circumstances, affected communities are justified in being mistrustful, even
suspicious, of the exercise of state power and the impartiality of government institutions, like the judiciary. In this context, decentralized sources of authority, particularly when it comes to addressing
the violent acts of the past, may be advantageous. As I have noted
in prior work, “[b]ecause ‘[t]he repeated experience of domination
and defeat leads to psychic withdrawal from the public sphere,’ another related goal of transitional justice is the reintegration of victims into society.”423 Building institutions that act in an official capacity, but are not state actors per se, like truth commissions, can
create arenas where victims or marginalized groups can engage
with an authority figure in ways that rebuild their trust and confidence in the rule of law. Even entities like REMHI that were not
state-sanctioned, but had the backing of the Catholic Church, an authority figure in Guatemala, can serve important state-like functions
in situations when state institutions are compromised.424
Moreover, in countries like Guatemala, where the entire state apparatus was involved in mass atrocity and state officials including
police may have an incentive to destroy or tamper with evidence,
SIMMONS, supra note 8, at 125.
Rachel López, The (Re)collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for Transitional Justice, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 799, 838 (2015) (quoting
Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 752).
424
Interview with Judge Miguel Galvez, supra note 372.
422
423
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TRCs can play a special role as custodians of evidence. In a number
of cases, REMHI filled this role. As mentioned above, REMHI created the first forensic team in Guatemala and the Attorney General’s
office used the forensic evidence gathered by this team in its cases.425
Similarly, in Edgar Fernando García I, the court admitted the recorded
testimony of another student who was detained at the same time as
Fernando Garcia and explained what occurred. This recording was
given to REMHI for safekeeping during the armed conflict and since
that student later went missing, the court would not have had access
to this information if REMHI had not safeguarded it.426 In that case,
the recording was determinative to the court’s final decision.427
This finding builds on the work of other scholars who have discussed the integrated nature of fact-finding, particularly in the human rights field. In particular, Pammela Quinn has discussed the
importance of other outside entities, who gather facts, later used by
courts in their decision-making.428 As Quinn points out, courts are
often ill-equipped to engage in the intensive fact-finding needed to
make fully informed judicial decisions.429 In contrast to courts, these
non-judicial institutions, such as TRCs, special rapporteurs, and
other ad hoc appointees are able to draw from a more extensive record and examine a large number of human rights violations as opposed to a single case that is the subject of a prosecution or other
legal dispute.430
6. CONCLUSION
As I have outlined in this article, the relics of the peace versus
justice debate have created unhelpful binary thinking about transitional justice that persists today. Even though scholars have begun
to acknowledge that the debate does not accurately reflect the lived
experience of post-conflict societies, the tendency to evaluate
Interview with a Diocese Coordinator of REMHI, supra note 153.
CEH Report, supra note 80, at 145 (Tomo VI, Anexo I, Casos Ilustrativos,
CI 48, Desapariciones forzadas de Edgar Fernando García, Sergio Saúl Linares
Morales y Rubén Amílcar Farfán. Fundación del Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM)).
427
Edgar Fernando García I, supra note 289, at 65.
428
See generally Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97 (2012).
429
Pammela Quinn, supra note 14 (“As critical as facts and fact-finding are to
judicial decision-making, courts are often poorly equipped to unearth them.”).
430
Id.
425
426
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transitional justice mechanisms as separate unrelated entities persists today and stymies further development of the field.
This study, because it is grounded in information from primary
sources obtained through field research in Guatemala and Spain,
provides a much richer picture of how the work of transitional justice mechanisms can be complementary. On one hand, the investigation, or lack thereof, can inform how TRCs evaluate the judiciary
in post-conflict countries and even aid in fact-finding. On the other
hand, as the case of Guatemala reveals, TRCs are not simply lesser
versions of traditional justice proceedings, but rather can play a critical role in advancing traditional justice and the rule of law in postconflict societies, by acting as norm diffusers, investigative units, locales for narrative contestation, and cultural conveyers to courts.
Post-conflict pluralism thus can be a vehicle for liberalization and
democratization.
In light of its benefits, we should embrace post-conflict pluralism, not only because it is inevitable, but also because it is desirable.
I thus urge us to design future transitional justice systems with the
coordination of these individual mechanisms in mind. This opens
the door for additional research in this area. For example, future researchers might examine how to balance the utility of TRC reports
as evidence in criminal trials with the due process rights of the accused.
In countries like El Salvador, whose high court recently invalidated the amnesty law enacted after that country’s civil war, and
Colombia, a country navigating its own transition, lessons about
post-conflict pluralism learned from the Guatemalan experience
will help them to anticipate ways that the work of TRCs (past or future) and trials can be more fully integrated.
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